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THE REVISED MODEL BUSINESS 
CORPORATION ACT AND CORPORATE 
LAW REFORM IN MISSISSIPPI: PART 
TWO 
Wendell H. Holmes* 
In the 1987 Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature, a 
new business corporation act for Mississippi (hereinafter New 
MBCA) became a reality.1 The new law became effective Janu­
ary 1, 1988.2 It is based almost entirely upon the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act (hereinafter RMA) and profoundly 
changes much of the state's pre-existing corporate law. Part One 
of this article,3 completed prior to the passage of the New 
MBCA, discussed in detail the relationship of the provisions of 
the RMA to the prior Mississippi Business Corporation Act 
(hereinafter Old MBCA) and proposed changes in Mississippi 
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center; formerly As­
sociate Professor of Law, University of Mississippi. B.A. 1974, Millsaps College; J.D. 
1977, Tulane University. 
' Mississippi Business Corporation Act, 1987 Miss. Laws Ch. 486 [hereinafter New 
MBCA], codified at Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 79-4-1.01 to-17.04 (Supp. 1987). The New 
MBCA repeals the former statute, Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-1 to-293 (1972 and Supp. 
1986) [hereinafter Old MBCA] in its entirety. 
• The New MBCA is to a large degree an outgrowth of the work of the Business Law 
Reform Task Force convened by Secretary of State Dick Molpus in July, 1986. The Task �orce undertook to draft proposed legislation to replace the existing business corpora­
tion, nonprofit corporation, professional corporation, limited partnership, and securities 
acts. The author was a member of the Task Force and of the subcommittee responsible 
for drafting the proposed business corporation act. The views expressed in this article 
are �olely those of the author and do not represent in any way those of any other person affiliated with the Task Force. 
Among the other legislation that was generated by the Task Force is a new nonprofit c�rp�ration act which closely parallels the New MBCA. This act is labeled the Missis­sippi Nonprofit Corporation Act, 1987 Miss. Laws Ch. 485, codified at Miss. CoDI;: ANN. §§ 79-11-101 to-399 (Supp. 1987). 
• 
.
Holmes, The Revised Model Business Corporation Act and Corporate Law Re­form in Mississip pi: Part One, 56 Miss. L.J. 165 (1986) [hereinafter Part One). 
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law (including substantial revisions to much o f  the RMA)4 in the 
areas of corporate formation and organization, and corporate 
management and governance. That work now serves as the au­
thor's critique of the New MBCA regarding those topics.5 The 
methodology of Part Two of this article will, logically, be some­
what different from that of  Part One. Whereas the earlier in­
stallment was primarily an analysis of existing Mississippi law 
with proposals for revision (using the RMA as the point of de­
parture for the revision process), this Part will undertake a criti­
cal analysis of the New MBCA in those areas not covered in 
Part One: capitalization, shareholder litigation, organic changes, 
and the problems of the closely-held business. 
I. CAPITALIZATION 
A. Par Value, Stated Capital, and Distributions 
By far the most revolutionary aspect of the New MBCA (at 
least in contrast to traditional Mississippi practice) is section 
6.40.8 In one swift motion, the concepts of par value, stated capi­
tal, earned surplus, capital surplus, and treasury stock were 
swept from the corporate statutes. The approach of the New 
MBCA to these areas is particularly striking in light of some 
highly idiosyncratic provisions of prior Mississippi law. 
Specifically, under the Old MBCA, the minimum permissi­
ble par value of stock was $1.00.7 Moreover, while no-par stock 
was ostensibly permitted, any practical advantage of  the concept 
was undercut by the statute's insistence that the issue price of 
no-par stock not be less than $1.00.8 Thus the raison d'etre of 
no-par stock, i.e., the elimination of "watered stock" liability, 
• It might be noted that Part One was completed prior to the finalization of the 
work of the Task Force. 
• The New MBCA uses the same numerical system as the RMA, resulting in easy 
c�oss-�eference. In addition, while the New MBCA (as is typical  of Mississippi legisla­
tion) includes no published commentary and little legislative history, the Official Com­
ments to the RMA should constitute persuasive authority regarding the interpretation of 
the new act. 
• See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.40. The new act adopts without change the corresponding provision of the RMA. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP AcT § 6.40 (1984). 7 Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 33. 
· 
•Id. 
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was completely defeated.• These aspects of the Old MBCA de­
prived corporate planners, arguably without justification,10 of a 
substantial degree of flexibility in matters involving a corpora­
tion's stock structure. 11 
Criticism of the par value concept has long been wide­
spread, and the breach in the dam occurred in 1975 when Cali­
fornia eliminated the requirement of a statement o f  par value of 
authorized shares.12 The ABA Committee on Corporate Laws 
took up the torch in 1979, 18 and its approach was reflected in the 
RMA and, correspondingly, by the New MBCA. 
The mere elimination of par value, however, might not ap­
pear at first blush to be that significant of a change. It is only in 
its relation to the question of dividends and distributions that 
its true importance is manifested. 
The Old MBCA was a traditional "earned surplus" stat­
ute. 14 Under its provisions, the par value of shares issued with a 
par value, or (absent any contrary allocation by the board of di­
rectors) the f ull consideratio n  for no-par shares was committed 
• For d iscussion of this issue under the Old MBCA, see Hodge & Perry, The Model 
Business Corporation Act: Does The Mississippi Version Lime The Bushes?, 46 Miss. 
L.J. 371, 380-81 (1975) (hereinafter Hodge & Perry] (liability of shareholder for watered stock). 
10 The historical rationale for the concept of par value has generally been twofold: to 
�ure equitable contributions among shareholders by requiring that they pay a standard price ("par") for their shares; and to provide a "cushion" of capital to which creditors of �he corporation would have recourse. See B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LBGAL APITAL 19, 22 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter MANNING, LEGAL CAPITAL] (general background � development of legal capital concept). That neither premise applies today is clear. 
�der current practice par value establishes only the minimum, not the actual, issue Pnc� �f shares. In addition, even under statutes such as the Old MBCA which prescribed � minimum capital contribution as a condition of doing business, the amount mandated 
J1�nerally $1000) was insufficient to provide any meaningful protection to creditors. See 
�BCA, supra note l, § 111; Hodge & Perry, supra note 9, at 379. 
12 
See Hodge & Perry, supra note 9, at 381-82. 
1975 Cal. Stat. 682, § 7, codified at CAL. CoRP. CooE § 202(d)(e). 
u Committee on Corporate Laws Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act 
- Amend · ' · af p· · l Pr .. ments to Financial Provisions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1867 (1979) (herem ter mancia 
n�visions] (amendments and comments of committee). The proposed changes were fi­
Cha� ?sP�
oved for inclusion in the Model Act in 1980. Committee ?n �rporate -�ws, 35 g m the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments to Financial Prov1Sions, 
8,�8· LAw. 1365 (1980). 
For a general discussion of such statutes, see MANNING, LEGAL CAPITAL, supra note 10, at 72-75. 
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to stated capital.111 The excess, if any, became capital surplus. 
Under ordinary circumstances, capital surplus could not be dis­
tributed to shareholders. Rather dividends (cash or property) 
could be paid only out of the "unreserved and unrestricted 
earned surplus"18 of a corporation, defined basically as the "bal­
ance of its net profits, income, gains and losses."11 In contrast, 
distributions (cash or property) from capital surplus18 were pro­
hibited absent authorization in the articles of incorporation or 
by two-thirds of the shareholders, and were subject to other con­
ditions involving the protection of senior security holders.19 
This much of the Old MBCA was representative of most 
earned surplus statutes; the exact parameters of a corporation's 
discretion in these matters was, however, clouded by an addi­
tional, non-uniform provision of the Old MBCA specifically 
prohibiting cash dividends unless paid out of unreserved and 
unrestricted earned surplus. 20 As previously discussed in some 
11 See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 39. If no-par shares were issued, at least $1.00 per 
share was required to be allocated to stated capital. Id. 
11 Id. § 83(a). 
17 Id. § 3(m). Stock dividends, however, could be issued out of any treasury shares 
reacquired out of surplus (presum ab ly earned or capital), and out of authorized but unis­
sued shares so long as appropriate amounts of "any unreserved and unrestricted surplus" 
were transferred to stated capital. Id. § 83(c), (d). 
" Id. § 3(1), (n). "Surplus" was defined as "the excess of the net assets of a corpora­
tion over its stated capital." "Capital surplus" was "the entire surplus of a corporation 
other than � ts earned surplus." Id. Functionally, capital surplus generally represented 
the excess (1f any) of the issue price of shares over their par value. 
. 
•• Id. § 85. Neither dividends nor distributions from capital surplus could be made 
if the corporation was insolvent or would thereby be rendered insolvent. 
T�e use of the label "distributions" was, of course, a distinction without a differ­
e�ce, since the economic effects on shareholders and the corporation were identical in 
either event; onl y the nature of the accounting transaction involved was in any way 
affected. 
so Id. § 87. The full text of the statute was as follows: 
Anything to the contrary in this chapter notwithstanding, the board of direc­�r� of a corporation shall never declare, nor shall a corporation pay, a cash 
dlVldend unless such dividend is out of the unreserved and unrestricted earned 
s�rplus only of sue� cor��ati on and has been legally appropriated for the spe­
cific purpose of paymg d1v1dends; provided further that no such dividend shall 
be declared or paid when th t' . . 
' 
e corpora ion 1s insolvent or when the pa yment 
thereof would render the t' · corpora ion insolvent or when such p a ym ent wou ld 
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detail in Part One, the full import of this additional restriction, 
particularly on the ability of a corporation to make cash distri­
butions from capital surplus, has never been clear. 11 Unless one 
were willing to rely upon the frankly artificial bifurcation of 
"dividends" and "distributions,"21 the Old MBCA made any 
such cash distributions of dubious legality. 21 
The drafters of the RMA recognized the irrationality of the 
earned surplus test as a device for protecting creditors and sen­
ior security holders from payments to junior security holders. 
Thus, in addition to eliminating the concepts of stated capital 
and par value, they subjected distributions to shareholders to 
the sole restriction of insolvency,34 at the same time consolidat­
ing under the classification "distributions" transactions previ­
ously denominated as dividends, distributions, share repur­
chases, redemptions, and distributions in liquidation. 
Thus, under section 1.40 of the New MBCA, a "distribu­
tion" is defined as "a direct or indirect transfer of money or 
other property (except its own shares) or incurrence of indebted­
ness by a corporation to or for the benefit of its shareholders," 
and may take the form of "a declaration or payment of a divi-
Id. 
be contrary to any provisions in the articles of incorporation. Nothing in this 
chapter shall impair or prevent a legal distribution to shareholders upon liqui­
dation or d issolution as provided in this chapter. 
•• See Hodge & Perry, supra note 9, at 377-79. 22 See note 19 supra. 
•• The statute could be circumvented however either by a redemption of stock out 
of capital surplus, or possibly by a prope:iy (in ki�d) distribution. See Hodge & Perry, supra note 9, at 378-79. 
. " See 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 484 (3d ed. 1985) (annotation notes that insolvency restriction was significant limitation on distributions); Financial Provisions, supr� note 13, at 1867-68 (supporting adoption of more rigid stated capital requirements). 
. 
It should be noted that this response to the inadequacy of stated capital provisions is not a · · h uld 
b 
n inevitable one; arguments have been advanced that the proper approac wo e the adoption of a more realistic minimum amount of stated capital which could not be 
�duced. See, e.g., Note, The Inadequacy of Stated Capital Requirements, 40 U. C1N. L. 
CSE�. 
823, 841 (1971) (article uses trust fund theory approach to justify increased stated Pita! requirements) . In effect this adopts the "trust fund" concept of Wood v. Dum­
�er, 30 F. Cas. 435 (No. 17,944)(C.C.D. Me. 1824). The logistical difficulties in both ormulating that "realistic" amount and in policing its maintenance make this a some­what utopian proposal. 
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dend; a purchase, redemption or other acquisition of shares; a 
distribution of indebtedness; or otherwise. "2
11 
The heart of the financial provisions, however, is section 
6.40. Under subsection (a), the board may authorize and the cor­
poration may make distributions to shareholders subject only to 
the restrictions of the articles (if any) and of subsection (c). The 
statutory restriction adopts the twofold standard of equity and 
balance sheet solvency.28 Thus, a distribution cannot be made if, 
after giving effect to it, the corporation cannot pay its debts as 
and when they became due (insolvency in the equity sense) or 
the corporation's total assets will be less than its total liabilities, 
together with the amount required to satisfy the liquidation 
rights of senior security holders (insolvency in the balance sheet 
sense).27 
The obvious merit of the new scheme is the flexibility it 
provides to corporate managers. Ironically, this flexibility may 
engender the criticism that the new system gives inadequate 
guidance to directors, many of whom (particularly in the closely­
held corporation which is the norm in Mississippi) may lack the 
requisite financial sophistication to make the judgments that the 
statute demands. 
Such criticisms are addressed only in part by the statute. 
Section 6.40(d) allows directors to rely upon financial statements 
prepared on the basis of accounting practices which are reasona­
ble under the circumstances, on a fair valuation, or  any other 
method reasonable under the circumstances. 28 The matter of 
16 New MBCA, supra note 1, § 1.40(6).  
21 See Financial Provisions, supra note 13, at 1868. 
27 See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.40(a),(c). Under the Old MBCA, "insolvency" 
meant only equity insolvency. See, e.g., Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 3(o). 
It should be n�ted that § 6.40 of the RMA has already been subject to an official 
amendment rega�dmg the determination of insolvency. Under that amendment, codified 
a�§ ?·40�g), any mdebtedness which by its terms can only be repaid to the extent that a 
distribution could be made is not treated as a liability under§ 6.40(c). See Committee on 
C�r�orate La�s, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act - Amendments Per­
taining to Distributions, 42 Bus. LAW. 259 (1986), 42 Bus. LAW. 1207 (1987) (amend­
ments and comments). This amendment was adopted in Mississippi i n  1988. Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-4-6.40(g)(Supp. 1988). 
" This terminology deliberatel ·ts " · · · d . Y om1 re1erence to technical accountmg Jargon an specific concepts such as " all d · · 
B 
gener Y accepte accounting prmciples." REVISED MooEL USINESS CORP. ACT § 6.40 Official Comment 4 (1984). 
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timing is governed by subsection (e), under which the effect of a 
distribution is determined in most cases as of the date of author­
ization, or the date of payment if more than 1 20 days after au­
thorization. 29 In all other respects the statute is silent as to fac­
tors that should guide the board's determination of whether 
solvency (particularly in the equity sense) will be impaired; due 
to the absence of any substantial case authority, the Official 
Comments to the RMA provide the only persuasive guidance on 
this issue.so In any event, while under new section 8.33, adopted 
in 1988, consenting directors are expressly subjected to personal 
liability for illegal distributions, that liability is enforced only to 
the extent that the director's conduct violates the duty of care 
embodied in section 8.30 of the New MBCA and is not shielded 
by the business judgment rule. si Thus, most misjudgments will 
20 See New MBCA, supra, 1, § 6.40(e)(3 ). Special rules are stated for distributions 
by purchase, redemption or other acquisition of shares, in which case the operative date 
is the earlier of the date money or property ie transferred or debt ie incurred, or the date 
the shareholder ceases to be a shareholder with respect to the acquired shares; and for 
other distributions of indebtedness, in which case the operative date is the date of distri· 
bution. Id. § 6.40(e)(l)-(2). This provision resolves the conflict posed in cases such as 
Williams v. Nevelow, 513 S.W. 2d 535 (Tex. 1974), in which the court held that for a 
corporation repurchasing shares in exchange for an installment promissory note, solvency 
was to be determined as of the time of the issuance of the debt instrument, not as of the 
time of each subsequent installment payment on the debt. The New MBCA embraces 
the rule of Williams. 
30 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. AcT § 6.40 Official Comment 2 (1984). The com­
ments state that decisions involving equity insolvency should be "based on a cash flow 
a
.
nalysis that is itself based on a business forecast and budget for a sufficient period of 
time to permit a conclusion that known obligations of a corporation can reasonably be expected to be satisfied over the period of time that they will mature." Id. Reliance �lely upon a comparison of current assets to current liabilities, or of the present liquida­t�on value of assets to existing liabilities, is eschewed. Id. In any event, the same deci­sions were required under the Old MBCA, which adopted the equity insolvency test. Old 
MBCA
, supra note l, § 3(o). 
81 Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-4·8.33 (Supp. 1988). The same result would have obtained under the New MBCA as originally enacted. See Financial Provisions, supra note 13, at 1882· The new statute adds express rights of contribution against other culpable direc­tors and shareholders who accepted the distribution knowing of the violation (which in­cl�des violations of the articles). Id. § 79-4-8.33(b). Any action must be commenced within two years of the date determined by § 6.40(c) or (g). Id. § 79-4-8.33(c). 
Section 8.30 of the New MBCA is identical to its counterpart in the RMA; for an extensive discussion of those provisions and the related business judgment rule, see Part One'. supra note 3, at 188-202. Of course, any decision tainted by self-dealing would be outside of the protection afforded by § 8.30. 
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not be actionable. 
B. Shares 
Corresponding to the changes involving par value and re­
lated concepts, the New MBCA differs substantially from its 
predecessor in its treatment of authorized shares. The New 
MBCA contains no reference to the traditional classification of 
"common" and "preferred" shares. Rather, the statute mandates 
only that there be at least one class of stock with unlimited vot­
ing rights, and at least one class of stock which is entitled to 
receive the net assets of the corporation in dissolution. 32 If more 
than one class of stock is authorized then the articles must pre­
scribe a distinguishing designation for shares ( which, presuma­
bly, could include the terms common or preferred) but no legal 
significance is attached to the nomenclature used. 33 Rather, of 
paramount importance under the New MBCA is the statement 
of preferences, limitations and relative rights contained in the 
articles - in the words of the Official Comments to the RMA, 
the "contract" between the owners of these shares and the cor­
poration with respect to their interests.3" Except as permitted 
for series of shares all shares of a class must have identical 
rights.35 As under the Old MBCA provisions on preferred stock, 
the variable rights and preferences permitted by the statute 
(which declares itself nonexclusive) include voting rights,38 re-
" New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6 .0l(b). Of course these rights may be consolidated 
in one class. 
u Id. § 6.0l(a). A possible exception to this is suggested by the RMA Comments, 
which state that if the fundamental rights of voting and residual equity interest are re­
posed in a single class of stock, that class may be described as simply "common shares." 
REVISED MooEL Bus1NEss CORP. ACT § 6.01 Official Comment 1 (1984). 
u REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §6.01 Official Comment 1 (1984). 
'" See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.0l(a). 
•• Id. § 6.0l(c)(l). It should be noted that, as originally adopted, the New MBCA 
would not have permitted nonvoting common stock pursuant to the m andate of Miss. 
CONST. �rt. 7, § 194. On November 10, 1987, the ele�torate approved Senate Concurrent 
Resolution No. 550 of the 1987 Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature which re­
peale? � 194. The original language of the New MBCA made nonvoting common stock 
perm1ss1ble unless prohibited by§ 194. New MBCA, supra, note 1, § 6.0l(c)(l). The 1988 
amendments to the New MBCA now simply sanction nonvoting shares generally. Miss. 
CODE ANN . § 79-4-6.0l(c)(l) (Supp. 1988). 
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demption or conversion features,37 and dividend and liquidation 
preferences. 38 As was true under the Old MBCA, 811 the new stat­
ute provides for the issuance of classes of shares in series (so­
called "blank stock") under which the board of directors, if so 
authorized by the articles of incorporation, can define the pre­
cise terms of each series by appropriate amendment to the arti­
cles at the time of issuance. •0 
As under the former statute,'1 the New MBCA permits the 
issuance of fractional shares or scrip.42 Holders of fractional 
shares have voting and proprietary rights; holders of scrip do not 
in the absence of contrary provision. The major innovation in 
the new law is that the board is now given the option of paying a 
shareholder the monetary value of fractional shares, or to "ar­
range for disposition of fractional shares," in addition to the is­
suance of fractional shares or scrip. 43 
As previously noted, 44 among the traditional corporate law 
notions abandoned by the New MBCA is that of treasury 
shares. '6 The drafters of the RMA concluded that the distinc­
tion between treasury shares and authorized but unissued shares 
was both unnecessary and, from many perspectives, undesir-
•• Id. § 6.0l(c)(2). The New MBCA changes existing law in this regard in one signifi­
cant respect. Under the Old MBCA the right to redeem shares was limited to the option 
of the corporation. Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 27(a). Under the New MBCA redemption 
may be authorized at the option of the shareholder, another person, or upon the occur­
rence of a designated condition. New MBCA supra note 1, § 6.0l(c)(2). Moreover, the 
price at which conversion or redemption is to occur may either be fixed by the articles, or 
may be determined by the use of a designated formula or by reference to extrinsic data 
or sources. Id. at § 6.0l(c)(l-2) . 
.. See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.0l(c)(3), (4). 
•• See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 29. 
b 
'0 .��e New. MBCA, supra note I, § 6.02. In this fashion, t.he board "fills in the .1anks ID previously authorized shares. Such amendments require no shareholder ac-
tion. Id. at § 6.02(d)(4). 
" See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 45. 
42 See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.04. 
•• Id. § 6.04(a)(l),(2). The "cash out" option is frequently employed in "going pri­
vate" transactions. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 6.04 Official Comment (1984). 
" s ee supra text accompanying notes 6 and 7. 
b 0 
See Old MBCA supra note 1, § 3(i). Those shares that were issue? but reacquired 
Y the corporation, and were held by the corporation rather than bemg cancelled or restored to the status of authorized but unissued shares were considered issued but not outsta nding. Id. See also New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6 .01(2) . 
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able.46 Thus, under the New MBCA, shares acquired by the cor­
poration are deemed to be authorized but unissued shares unless 
the articles prohibit their reissuance; in that event they are can­
celled, and the statute permits the directors to file without 
shareholder action an amendment to the articles reflecting the 
decrease in the number of authorized shares."7 Since the eco­
nomic effect of the transaction is essentially that of a distribu­
tion of corporate assets, any reacquisition is within the defini­
tion of distribution and subject to the restrictions of section 
6.40.48 
Together with the elimination of par value, stated capital 
and surplus, the New MBCA substantially modifies the rules in­
volving the consideration for issuance of shares and its alloca­
tion. The Old MBCA, like most traditional statutes, limited the 
permissible consideration for shares to money, tangible or intan­
gible property, or services actually performed; promissory notes 
were specifically prohibited. The judgment of the board as to the 
value of consideration received was conclusive absent fraud.49 
Substantially greater flexibility is provided under the new 
act, which adds promissory notes, contracts for future services, 
and other securities of the corporation to the roster of eligible 
forms of consideration.60 The board is required to determine the 
0 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.31 Official Comment (1984). 
" See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.31. 
•• See New MBCA, supra note 1, §§ 1.40(6), 6.40; REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. 
ACT § 6.31 Official Comment (1984). See also supra notes 6, 28 and accompanying text. 
Under the Old MBCA shares could be repurchased only out of earned surplus, by article 
authorization or two-thirds approval of shareholders, or capital surplus. Old MBCA, 
supra note 1, § 9. Exceptions existed for purchases made to eliminate fractional shares, 
collecting or compromising debts, payments under dissenters' rights, and redemption or 
purchase to return redeemable shares. Id. § 9 (a-d). Under the New MBCA the twofold 
insolvency test would be the sole limitation on any reacquisition. See, e.g., New MBCA, 
supra note 1, § 6.40(c). 
" See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 35. 
•• See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.2l(b). An exception was made in the 1987 act f?� transportation corporations, due to a constitutional limitation applicable to such en­
tities for money, property actually received, or labor done (or in good faith agreed to be 
done). Miss. _CONST. art. 7, § 195 ; New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.2l(F). Senate Concur­
rent_ Resolution No. 548 of the 1987 Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature, re­
pealing§
_ 
195, was approved by the electorate on November 10, 1987. A n  amendment was 
adopted m 1988 to the statute to remove the special rule stated in § 6.21. Miss. CODE 
ANN. § 79-4-6.21 (Supp. 1988). The statute p rovides for protective mechanisms, such as 
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value of consideration received or to be received but only for the 
purpose of determining that the shares are validly issued, fully 
paid and nonassessable; its determination is declared conclusive 
for these purposes.111 The "fraud" standard placed on the discre­
tion of the board is eliminated; liability for improper issuance of 
shares is thus governed by the ordinary duty of care of section 
8.30 and the conflict of interest provisions of section 8.31.112 
Due to the elimination of the par value and stated capital 
concepts, the board is no longer required to allocate considera­
tion received for shares to "stated capital" and "surplus" ac­
counts,113 as was mandated by prior law.11• 
As under prior law,1111 a shareholder's liability is limited to 
the agreed consideration under section 6.20 or as provided in a 
subscription agreement;116 the new statute also expressly insu­
lates shareholders from personal liability for corporate obliga­
tions except those for which his own conduct creates liability.117 
The New MBCA also makes an important change in prior 
law dealing with stock options. Under the Old MBCA any option 
issued as a means of compensation to directors, officers, employ­
ees or subsidiaries, not part of a general issuance to other share-
dePosit of shares in escrow, when shares are issued for notes or future services. Id. § 
6.21(e). 
51 Id. § 6.2l(c),(d). 
51 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Ac:r § 6.21 Official Comment (1984). aa Id. Of course the statute does not prohibit the use of such categories as an ac-
counting matter, if the board desires. Id. 
54 See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 39. 
aa Id. § 47. 
"" New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.20. These provisions d o  not substantially deviate 
from the prior statute. See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 31. 
• 
57 See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.22. The statute does permit, however, the 
imposition of such liability by a provision in the articles. Id. §§ 2.02(b)(2)(v), 6.22(b). 
The New MBCA, then, eliminates any potential for "watered stock" liability based 
solely upon the issuance of shares below an artificially determined price. Rather, 
problems of overreaching, unfairness or unequal treatment are now placed under the 
broader penumbra of the board's fiduciary obligations. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. § 6.21 Official Comment (1984); Financial Provisions, supra note 13, at 1879. 
A special rule permits the issuance of shares to existing shareholders without consid­
eration (i.e., as a stock dividend or stock split) so long as this is done on a pro rata basis, 
and such issuance does not dilute the interests of a class of stockholders without their 
approval. See, e.g., New MBCA, supra note l, § 6.23(a)(b). 
It should be noted that, in all events, the sole power to issue stock can be reserved to 
the shareholders in the articles. Id. § 6.21(a). 
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holders, required the approval of a majority of shareholders.H 
This provision was an indefensible restriction on the board's dis­
cretion, given the widespread acceptance of incentive compensa­
tion plans, and extrinsic rules requiring their d isclosure in most 
public companies.119 Thus the New MBCA deletes the require­
ment of shareholder approval altogether, rendering the matter 
one of business judgment and fiduciary duty of the board.80 
C. Preemptive Rights 
As under prior law,81 the New MBCA makes preemptive 
rights62 elective; that is, they do not exist unless so provided in 
the articles.63 The Old MBCA did not, however ,  address the con­
tent of preemptive rights if only the mere election to provide 
them was made; with little Mississippi case law to consult for 
guidance one would have to divine the effect of the grant of 
"preemptive rights" from other common law authority.8• Section 
6.30 of New MBCA, which statutorily defines the presumptive 
effect of preemptive rights, is arguably an improvement over the 
silence of its predecessor. However, it erects traps for the un­
wary that should be carefully scrutinized by planners. 
Speci fically, under the New MBCA, a statement that the 
corporation elects preemptive rights, without any e xpress provi­
sion to the contrary, will not entitle shareholders to exercise pre-
08 See Old MBCA, supra note l, § 37 . 
.. See 17 C.F .R .  § 240.14a-101 (1987)(disclosure of compensation plans in proxy 
statements of corporations registered under § 12(g) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
Moreover, as the comments to the RMA point out, approval may be required by 
stock exchange rules. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 6.24 Official Comment 
(1984). 
•• See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.24. 
11 See Old MBCA, supra note l, § 49. 
�· I.e., the right of existing shareholders to acquire their proportionate share of any 
new issuance of stock before sales to others. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LA ws OF CORPO­
RATIONS § 174 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter HENN & ALEXANDER]. See New MBCA, supra 
note l, § 6.30. 
•• 
See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.30. 
14 The gen�rally accepted view was that preemptive rights did not attach to treasury 
shares, shares issued for non-cash consideration, or shares issued in connection with a 
merger or consolidation; a split of authority existed as to whether they applied to origi­
nally authorized but unissued shares. See HENN & ALEXANDER supra note 62 § 174, at 
�fil • 
' 
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emptive rights with respect to (a) shares issued as compensation 
to directors, officers, agents, employees, subsidiaries or affiliates, 
or to satisfy conversion or option rights created as compensation 
to any of those persons; (b) originally authorized shares issued 
within six months of incorporation; and (c) shares issued for 
consideration other than money (e.g., property or services).H 
Moreover, preemptive rights are denied to shares with limited 
voting rights but preferential distribution rights; shares with 
general voting rights but no preferences have no rights to shares 
with preferences unless t hose shares are convertible into shares 
without preferences.68 Finally, if shares subject to preemptive 
rights are not acquired by shareholders, they can be offered to 
third parties for a period of  one year at a price not less than that 
at which they were offered to the shareholder; an offer at a lower 
price or after one year again invokes the preemptive right.67 
Preemptive rights generally are not utilized in the public 
corporation arena but are frequently encountered as a protective 
device for minority shareholders in closely-held corporations.68 
This being the case, it must be noted that the New MBCA cre­
ates various avenues whereby a majority interest can effectively 
avoid the right-for example, by issuing shares as compensation 
to a majority director or officer or by issuing shares for property 
or services. While any such action taken as an oppressive mea­
sure could trigger liability for breach of fiduciary duty/111 lengthy 
and expensive litigation may be necessary on the shareholder's 
part to assert the right t o  maintain his proportionate position. 
Thus, planners representing minority shareholders should con-
0 See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.30 (b)(3). 
•• Id. § 6.30(b)(4)-(5). 
• 87 Id. § 6.30(b)(6). It should also be noted that preemptive rights can be waived without consideration. Id. § 6.30(b)(2). 
•• R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 17.1.4 (1986) [hereinafter CLARK]. 47 •• See Katzowitz v. Sidler, 24 N.Y.2d 512, 515, 249 N.E.2d 359, 364, 301 N.Y.S.2d 
_o, 477 0969)(offer of shares at 1/18 of book value without valid business purpose and with intent to dilute interest of dissenting shareholder held breach of fiduciary duty). �ut cf. Masure v. Osborne, 388 Pa. 121, 130 A.2d 157, 159 (1957)(book value not conclu­sive of market value; offer to plaintiff was prima facie evidence of good faith). Of course, 
Preemptive rights often give a minority shareholder nothing more than the option of throwing his money down a bottomless well· thus other structural protections should be considered by representatives of such inter�sts. 
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sider the inclusion of appropriate provisions in the articles to 
broaden the scope of preemptive rights and narrow the statutory 
loopholes. 
II. SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
Prior Mississippi law contained only one brief statutory ref­
erence and virtually no case authority70 on the subject of share­
holders' derivative actions.71 The only reference in the Old 
MBCA was section 93, which incorporated the contemporaneous 
ownership requirement, i.e., that only one who was a shareholder 
at the time the challenged transaction took place could file a de­
rivative suit.72 The statute's silence was particularly maddening 
since the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure failed to adopt 
Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with 
derivative actions.78 Thus the New MBCA provisions on deriva­
tive suits bring welcome clarification to this area of Mississippi 
law; nonetheless it is only fair to say that the new statute leaves 
unanswered a number of significant questions. 
Section 7.40 of the New MBCA was adopted without change 
from the RMA. Two prerequisites exist to maintaining a deriva­
tive action: first, as under the prior statute, the plaintiff must 
have been a shareholder (either of record or beneficial owner) as 
'0 The sole annotated case is Liberty Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mitchell, 398 So. 2d 208 
(Miss. 1981), which while derivative in nature involved no typical derivative action is­
sues. Of course such a dearth of case authority on corporate issues in Mississippi is 
hardly unique. See Part One, supra 3, at 168. 
71 For useful general background, see CLARK, supra note 68, §§ 15.l - 15.10. See also 
HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 62 § 358-81. 
12 The text of the statute read as follows: 
No action shall be brought in this state by a sharehol der in the right of a 
domestic or foreign corporation unless the plaintiff was a holder of shares or of 
voting trust certificates therefor at the time of the transaction of which he 
complains, or his shares or voting trust certificates thereafter devolved upon 
him by operation of law from a person who was a holder at such time. 
Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 93. In contrast, the 1969 Model Act also provided for (1) 
�ayr:nent to the defe�dant by plaintiff of reasonable expenses upon final judgment and a 
tindmg that the action was brought without reasonable cause, and (2) security for ex­
penses. MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. AcT § 49 (1969). For a detailed discussion of the contem· 
poraneous ownership requirement, see Harbrecht, The Contemporaneous Ownership 
Rule in Shareholders' Derivative Suits, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1041 (1978). 
. 
,. �E�. �· Civ. P. 23.1. Since the federal rule would apply in the federal courts of 
Mississippi, it was, however, the most likely authority to be applied by analogy. 
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of the time of the challenged transaction or have received his 
shares by operation of law from such an owner7'; and second, the 
complaint, which must be verified,76 must allege with particular­
ity those e fforts made to obtain action by the board and their 
refusal to act, or why the failure to take such action should be 
excused.76 Like most statutes ,  however, the New MBCA is un­
fortunately silent on the issue of what constitutes "demand fu­
tility," a matter on which a substantial body of often contradic­
tory case law exists. 77 The new statute empowers the court to 
stay any action pending an investi gation by the corporation. 78 
A matter of great practical significance to shareholders' at­
torneys is that the New MBCA, unlike the statutes of several 
major states, 79 makes n o  provision for security for expenses as a 
prerequisite to suit.80 Rather, abusive or vexatious litigation is 
deterred by the potential for an award of the defendant's rea­
sonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, if the court on ter­
mination (not "final judgment") finds that the suit was brought 
" See New MBCA, supra note 1 ,  § 7.40 (a), (e). 
70 Id. § 7.40(b). This requirement, imported from Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1, has been held 
� require only that the plaintiff have a good faith belief in the accuracy of the allega­
tions made, notwithstanding his failure to understand the complaint. Surowitz v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 ( 1966), reh. denied, 384 U.S. 915 (1966). 
• 
78 See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 7.40(b). Unlike the Federal Rules, no reference 1� made to necessity for demand on shareholders, a prerequisite applied in a few jurisdic­tions. See, e.g. , Solomon & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 
93 N.E.2d 241, 248 (Mass. 1950)(if demand on officer fails, then other shareholders must be served demand). The Federal Rules require such demand only "if necessary," presum­ably under the substantive law of the state, and like the RMA most modem statutes adopt no such requirement. A collection of cases on the issue may be found at 2 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 741-43 (3rd ed. 1985). 
77 For a useful summary of recent cases on point, see 2 REVISED MonEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 737-41 (3d ed. 1985). 
78 See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 7.40 (b) . 
• 
70 See, e.g. ,  CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 800(c)-(O (West 1977 & Supp. 1987)(motion for se­curi:y
. allowed if no benefit to corporation or shareholders, or if moving party was not 
r.�:ticipant in 
.transaction); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1986)(corpo
ration en-
1 ed to security from plaintiffs). Currently eighteen states have such statutes. 2 REVISED 
�ODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. 728 (3d. 1985). On the other hand, the Illinois Business or��ration Act of 1983 makes no such provision. ILL. REV. STAT . . ch. 
32, § �.80. (1?85). 
. The drafters of the RMA took the position that such requirements d1scr1mmate un�airly against the small shareholder and are inconsistent with other types of corporate �ctions (e.g. , antitrust and class actions) that involve substantial litigation expense but unpose no similar impediment. REVISED MooEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.40 Official Com­
ment l (h)( 1984). 
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without reasonable cause.81 
As is true of most derivative action statutes,82 the New 
MBCA provides that such suits cannot be discontinued or set­
tled without court approval. Notice of any settlement or discon­
tinuance, if approved, must be given to the shareholders if the 
court determines that their interests will be substantially 
affected. 83 
Perhaps the most troublesome omission in the New MBCA 
(as in its source, the RMA) is the failure to deal with the effect 
of a determination by the board of directors, or a special litiga­
tion committee appointed by the board, that the pursuit of a 
derivative claim is against the best interest of the corporation. 
Substantial variance in approach to this issue exists among re­
cent cases. The New York rule, established by Auerbach v. Ben­
nett,84 is that the trier of fact may examine the independence, 
good faith, and diligence of the body recommending dismissal; 
beyond this, the court will not second guess the merits of the 
recommendation but will apply the business judgment rule. A 
more complex approach is taken in Delaware where, under 
Zapata Corporation v. Maldonado,85 the court is to apply a two-
•• See New MBCA supra note 1, § 7.40 (d). The comments to the RMA state that it 
was deemed unnecessary to make reference to an award of attorney's fees to a successful 
plaintiff, in light of the universal recognition of this right both legislatively and judi­
cially. REVISED MoDEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 7.40 Official Comment l (i) (1984). 
11 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (court approval necessary for settlement); 2 REVISED 
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 727 (3d ed. 1985) (no compromise allowed without 
court approval). 
aa See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 7.40 (c). The statute does not prescribe who is to 
bear the expense of such notice (which, obviously, could be considerable); the comments 
to the RMA state that this is discretionary with the court. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS 
CoRP. AcT § 7.40 Official Comment l(i) (1984). 
84 47 N.Y. 2d 619, 633, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (1979) . 
.. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).  The significance of Zapata has, however, been undercut 
by t�o subsequent decisions. In Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), the court 
held m effect that demand on directors should be excused only where, under the particu­
l�r facts alleged by the plaintiff, a reasonable doubt exists as to the independence of the 
directors and the fact that the decision would be upheld by the business judgment rule. �d. at �14. See Recent Decisions, Corporations - Derivative Action -- Demand Futility 
IS Achi�ved by the Creation of a Reasonable Doubt of Directorial Disinterest Through 
All�g�tions of Factual Particularity, 55 Miss. L.J. 181, 194 (1985)(discussing Aronson 
dec�s�on). Moreover, in Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1 184 (Del. 1985), the court upheld a 
?ec191on by the trial judge to forego application of the second tier "independent business 
Judgment" review of Zapata, emphasizing that this step was purely discretionary. 499 
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step process. First, the court must review the good faith and in­
dependence of the decisionmaker and the factual bases underly­
ing its recommendation, as to which the corporation has the bur­
den of proof. Secondly, assuming that the corporation meets this 
burden, the court is to determine by applying its own business 
judgment whether a motion to dismiss should be granted. 86 
The drafters of the RMA simply sidestepped the issue, not­
ing only that the law was "in state of flux" and should be al­
lowed to develop judicially, with the possibility of an appropri­
ate amendment to the RMA at a later date. 87 Since the 
resolution of this question may as a practical matter be the most 
significant issue in many derivative actions, I would urge the 
Mississippi Legislature to monitor closely the progress of the 
RMA in this regard and to consider the early adoption of an 
amendment to section 7.40 of the New MBCA to provide a clear 
standard for our courts to apply. 
III. ORGANIC CHANGES 
The New MBCA substantially alters existing laws in the 
area of fundamental corporate changes. Those matters will be 
A.2d at 1 192. 
" Accord, Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888-89 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 
1051 (1983) (business judgment rule does not apply when special litigation committee 
recommends dismissal of shareholder's derivative suit). For additional background see, 
e.g., Block & Prussin, Termination of Derivative Suits Against Directors on Business 
Judgment Grounds: From Zapata to Aronson, 39 Bus. LAW. 1503, 1505-07 (1984) (only 
excused when board is extremely self-interested); Block & Prussin, The Business Judg­
ment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27, 35 (gen­
eral discussion of demand requirement); Brown, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and 
the Special Litigation Committee, 43 U. PrIT. L. REv. 601, 610-19 (1982)(examination of shareholder demand rule before Aronson); Chittur, Ventriloquism For Corporate Direc­tors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit, 75 Nw. 
U.L. REv. 96, 98-124 (1980)(emphasis on Auerbach and relative positions of directors, 
:hareholders and litigation committees); Note, Special Litigation Committees: An Un-
. 
elcome Solution to Shareholders Demands, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 485, 493-97 (examina­tion of business judgment rule and demand requirements with thorough analysis of rele­vant case law). 
Yet another position was taken in Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W. 2d 709 (Iowa 1983), which refused to recognize a board-appointed committee but 
�uggested that the court itself might appoint a committee of disinterested and exper­ienced persons to make a recommendation on the issue. Id. 
87 REVISED MODEL Bus1NEss CoRP. Acr § 7.40 Official Comment 2(a) (1984). 
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discussed here under the classifications of amendments to the 
articles, sales of assets, corporate combinations, dissolution, and 
dissenters' rights. 
A. Amendments to the Articles and Bylaws 
In most respects, the New MBCA does not differ markedly 
from the provisions of the Old MBCA.88 As under the prior law, 
the articles can be amended to include any provision which 
would have been permissible in the original articles. In lieu of an 
illustrative list of allowable amendments the new statute merely 
states that existing shareholders have no property right in any 
provision of the articles. 89 One innovation of the New MBCA is 
a list of certain essentially technical amendments which can be 
made by the directors without shareholder action.90 Among 
these is one of significance to all Mississippi corporate practi­
tioners: i.e., an amendment to extend the corporation's duration 
if incorporated at a time when limited duration was required by 
law.91 Now that the Mississippi Constitution has been amended 
to delete the ninety-nine year limitation on corporate life,92 
counsel should avail themselves of this opportunity to obtain the 
privilege of perpetual existence. 93 
The procedure for other article amendments is much the 
same as the old statute: proposal by the directors and approval 
by the shareholders at a meeting called for that purpose.94 The 
•• See generally Old MBCA, supra note 1, §§ 115-129. 
" See New MBCA, supra note, 1, § 10.01. Thus the statute rejects the "vested 
rights" theory which some courts extrapolated from Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), requiring unanimous shareholder consent for 
any article amendment. For background on this problem, see 3 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS 
CORP. AcT ANN. 1150-51 (3d ed. 1985); HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 62, § 340, at 951-
55. In any event the vested rights theory was constitutionally rejected in Mississippi. See 
Miss. CoNsT. art. 7, § 178. 
90 See New MBCA, supra note l, § 10.02. 
•• Id. § 10.02(1). 
. 
"' 1987 Miss. Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 549, amending Miss. CONST. art. 7, 
§ I 78 (approved by the electorate November 10, 1987). This restriction was codified in 
Old �BCA, su;:ra note 1, § 109. See also Part One, supra note 3, at 172 n. 27. 
Appropriate amendments to New MBCA § 3.02 and § 10.02 were enacted in 1988. 
Miss. CooE ANN. §§ 79-4-3.02, -10.02(1 )(Supp
. 1988). 
•• .. See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 10.03. The directors are called upon to "recom­
mend the amendment to the shareholders unless precluded from this by a conflict of 
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major substantive deviatio n  from prior law is that in the absence 
of a contrary provision in the articles requiring a greater vote, 
approval of the amendment requires only the vote of a majority, 
rather than two-thirds, of the votes of each voting group911 enti­
tled to vote thereon.96 The statute actually imposes a two-fold 
test: if the amendment would not trigger dissenters' rights, then 
an affirmative majority of votes cast at a meeting where a quo­
rum was present would s uffice;" however, as to any voting group 
for whom the amendment invokes dissenters' rights, a majority 
of the outstanding shares of that group is also needed for 
approval. 98 
As under prior law, the concept of class voting on amend­
ments is preserved although under the designation of votes by 
voting groups. This right is extended to shares with no general 
voting rights if the rights o f  such shares would be affected in one 
of nine enumerated ways.99 
The amendment once approved is effected by filing articles 
of amendment with the Secretary of State, including prescribed 
information concerning the text of the amendment and the vote 
thereon. Consistent with the approach taken under the New 
MBCA generally, the formal issuance of a "certificate of amend­
ment" is eliminated.100 Also as under prior law, the board can 
restate the corporation's articles without shareholder action,101 
interest or "other special circumstances" which must be communicated to the sharehold­
ers. The board may also condition its submission "on any basis." Id. § 10.03 (b)-(c). 
Prior to the issuance of shares either the board or incorporators have plenary power 
to amend the articles. Id. § 10.05. 
90 The concept of voting groups is discussed in Part One, supra note 3, at 235-36. 
" See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 10.03(e). The statute also allows the board to �ter the ordinary voting rights of shareholders by appropriately conditioning its submis­
��n to the. shareholders. Id. § 10.03(c). See also REVISED MODEL �USINESS ?ORP. ACT § ·03 Offic1al Comment (1984)(examples of conditions commonly rmposed m order for amendment approval). 
97 This is the customary requirement for effective shareholder action, and treats ab-stenf ( · "t ions as such, not as negative votes. See Part One, supra note 3, at 233-34 maJOrl Y of votes cast is sufficient to indicate shareholder approval) .  
98 See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 10.03(e). 
" Id. § 10.04. 
100 See New MBCA supra note 1 § §  1 25(b) 2.03; Part One, supra note 3, at 173. 101 See New MBCA supra note i § io.07. This presupposes, of course, that the restate ' ' 
· h ment contains no changes not previously approved by the shareholders; m sue event shareholder approval must to that extent be obtained. Id. § 10.07(b). 
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and amendments pursuant to federal bankruptcy reorganization 
proceedings require neither board nor shareholder action. 102 
The provisions of the New MBCA on bylaw amendments 
are substantially more detailed than those of the previous stat­
ute and make at least one substantive change. Under the Old 
MBCA, the power to adopt or amend bylaws rested exclusively 
with the board absent a provision in the articles which "re­
served" such power to shareholders.103 Conversely, under the 
new statute the power to amend or repeal bylaws is essentially 
coterminous between the board and stockholders. Indeed, the 
New MBCA actually shifts the balance in favor of  the share­
holders since the board's power may be limited either by an ex­
clusive reservation in the articles to the shareholders, or by a 
statement in any action by the shareholders amending or repeal­
ing a bylaw which provides that the board may not thereafter 
amend or repeal it.104 
Unlike the prior law, the New MBCA deals e xpressly with 
supermajority provisions for both shareholders and directors. If 
authorized by the articles, shareholders may adopt or amend by­
laws providing for a greater vote or quorum requirement than 
imposed by statute. Such action requires compliance with the 
greater of the existing or proposed requirements for quorum and 
votes. Any such bylaw cannot be adopted, amended or repealed 
by the board.1011 Bylaws dealing with supermajority requirements 
for the board are treated differently: if adopted by the share­
holders, only they can amend; if by the directors, either the di-
IOI Id. § 10.08. 
••• See Old MBCA, supra note 1 ,  § 51 .  
104 See New MBCA supra note 1 ,  § 10.20. Presumably the initial bylaws would be 
a?opted by the board absent contrary provision in the articles, although the act does not 
directly address this question. 
While there was some split of authority, the prevailing view under statutes like the 
Old MBCA appeared to be that the shareholders retained inherent power to amend or 
repeal bylaws. See 3 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 121 1 -12  (3d 1985)(statu· 
tory and case law background of shareholders rights to repeal or amend bylaws); HENN & 
ALEXAND�R, suP_ra �ote 62, § 133, at 308 & nn. 1 1 -12 (formulation of initial bylaws is 
power enjoyed . m. different jurisdictions by incorporators, shareholders or board). The New MBCA ehmmates any ambiguity on this issue 
••• See New MBCA, supra note 1 ,  § 10.21. Thus". for example, any attempt by share­
holder� to amen� an existing bylaw fixing a 75% vote requirement to reduce it to 50% 
would itself require a 75% affirmative vote. 
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rectors or shareholders can amend.106 
B. Sales of Assets 
The Old MBCA followed the traditional statutory approach 
of requiring shareholder approval (by a two-thirds majority) of 
the "sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposi­
tion" of all or substantially all of a corporation's assets other 
than in the ordinary course of business. 107 The New MBCA 
changes this in three substantial respects. 
First, the board is authorized to mortgage or otherwise en­
cumber all or substantially all assets, either in or out of ordinary 
course of business, without shareholder action (unless required 
by the articles).108 This is  clearly a salutary change; matters of 
corporate financing (as opposed to the disposition of all or the 
bulk of a corporation's property) should appropriately be dele­
gated to the board's discretion, subject only to the restrictions of 
the duties of care and loyalty.109 
Second, transfers to a wholly-owned subsidiary are not sub­
ject to shareholder approval. 110 
The third change, consistent with the general tenor of the 
New MBCA, is that for those transactions subject to shareholder 
approval, only a majority of votes entitled to be cast, rather than 
two-thirds, is required absent contrary provisions in the 
articles.1 11 
•oe Id. § 10.22(a). Consistent with the previous sections, such a bylaw adopted by the s�areholders may contain a provision requiring a specified vote of either shareholders or 
directors for any change to be effective. In addition, any board action to change a supermajority bylaw provision must also comply with the greater of the existing or pro­posed standard. Id. § 10.22(b)-(c). See supra text accompanying note 105. 
• 
107 Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 157. The converse, expressly provided in the statute, 18 that no such approval was required for transfers made in the "usual and regular course of business." Id. § 155 . .•• s ee New MBCA, supra note 1, § 12.0l(a)(2), (b). ••• The requirement of shareholder approval of mortgages of property seems partic­ularly anomalous in view of the board's unrestricted power to borrow without share­holder action. See Hodge & Perry, supra note 9, at 384-85 (emphasizing expense and �elay caused by requiring shareholder approval of mortgages). The requirement has been eleted from the Model Act since 1962. 3 REVISED MODEL BusJNESS CoRP. ACT ANN. 1321 
(3d ed. 1985). llO s N ee ew MBCA, supra note 1, § 12.01 (a)(3). 1 1 1  Id. § 12.02 (e). The procedure for authorizing sales or other dispositions not in 
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C. Mergers and Share Exchanges 
The New MBCA makes a number of highly significant 
changes in current law dealing with corporate combinations: 
elimination of the concept o f  consolidations; introduction of cash 
mergers and share exchanges to Mississippi; and liberalization of 
the provisions on short-form mergers. 
Chapter 11 of the New MBCA makes no mention of the 
consolidation procedure provided by the Old MBCA. 1 1 2  This is a 
rational omission: consolidations rarely occurred, since it is de­
sired in most combination transactions that one of the constitu­
ents survive. In any event, the practical effect o f  a consolidation 
can be achieved by the simple expedient of forming a new corpo­
ration and merging the constituents into it. 113  
Of much greater practical importance is the availability of 
the cash merger as a means o f  eliminating shareholders from the 
combined business. Under the Old MBCA cash mergers were 
impermissible, since the general merger statute required that the 
plan of merger state the basis for "converting the shares of each 
merging corporation into shares or other securities or obliga­
tions of the surviving corporation or any other corporation."114 
Thus, with the exception of short-form mergers of subsidiar­
ies, 1111 a merger could not be used as a "cash-out" device in Mis­
sissippi. The New MBCA, however, allows the shares of the con­
stituents to be converted as well "into cash or other property in 
whole or part."116 This gives management an enormous element 
the regular course of business is essentially the same as for amendments to the articles, 
discussed at notes 97-99 supra and accompanying text. See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 
12.02(0-(g). 
T�o other features of the new law should be briefly noted. The first is that the 
board is e�powe.red to abandon any transaction once approved without further share­holder acti
.
on (without, of course, prejudicing any contractual rights of third parties). 
The other is that transactions which involve a transfer of assets but which actually serve 
the purpose of a distribution (e.g., a "spin-off'' or other divisive reorganization) are gov­
erne�
1
by the rules on distributions. Id. § 12.02(0-(g). 
�ee Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 143. In a traditional consolidation, two or more �orporatlons. would combine to form a third, new corporation, i.e., neither of the combin· mg corporations would survive. 
m REVISED Mo B C 1 1 4  DEL USINESS ORP. ACT Ch. 11, Introductory Comment (1984). 
m 
See Old MBC�, supra note 1, § 141(c)(emphasis added) .  Id. § 149; see infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. 110 See New MBCA • supra note 1, § l l.Ol(b)(3). Cash mergers were added to the 
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of flexibility in the merger process. However, it likewise injects 
into Mississippi law the highly volatile issue of whether a merger 
intended to freeze out minority shareholders may constitute a 
breach of fiduciary obligation by those in control.117 Since the 
statute permits this procedure it is obviously not automatically 
voidable; the appropriate standard of review is of course not ad­
dressed by the statute and will be a matter with which Missis­
sippi courts will ultimately grapple. 
Even more innovative is the New MBCA provision for share 
exchanges. This procedure, unknown to common law and tradi­
tional statutes, was added to the Model Act in 1976 in order to 
provide a direct means whereby a corporation being acquired 
does not disappear but becomes a subsidiary of the acquiring 
corporation.118 Under the Old MBCA this result could be accom­
plished only by the so-called reverse triangular merger: the ac­
quiring corporation forms a subsidiary in which it places securi­
ties or cash; the subsidiary then merges with the target 
corporation, which receives securities or cash of the parent for 
its shares and ceases to exist. 119 The Old MBCA authorized the 
Model Act in the 1969 revision. See 2 MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. ACT ANN. § 71(c) (2d ed. 
1971) (examines allowance of cashout mergers); Garrett, Merger Meets the Common 
Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1509, 1515 (1985) [hereinafter Garrett] (discussion of impact of 
allowing cash out mergers). 
117 A useful summary of the recent cases (mostly from Delaware) on this issue is 
found at 3 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. ANN. 1261-67 (3d ed. 1985). For further 
background, see Herzel & Colling, Establishing Procedural Fairness in Squeeze-Out 
Mergers After Weinberger v. UOP, 39 Bus. LAW. 1525 (1984) (discussion of current state 
of procedural fairness standard) ;  Berger & Allinham, A New Light on Cash - Out Merg­
ers: Weinberger Eclipses Singer, 39 Bus. LAW. 1 (1984)(examination of evolution of 
courts' treatment of mergers) ;  Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections 
on Recent Developments in Delaware Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913 (1982)(re­
cent Delaware cases expand ability of dissident shareholders to challenge mergers); 
Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 647 (1984)(general review of statutory and case Jaw limitations); Com­
ment, Freezeouts Under the 1983 Illinois Business Corporation Act: The Need for Pro­
tection of Minority Shareholders From "Going Private" Transactions, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 679 (1985) (limited protection available to minority shareholders). 
"" See Garrett, supra note 1 16, at 1516. The equivalent of a share exchange has, of course, always been possible assuming the unanimous consent of the shareholders of the 
�arget corporation; the innovation of the new procedure is to permit this, like a merger, 
m the absence of unanimity. 118 For a somewhat more detailed description, see Norton, The Acquisition Process and the Closely-Held Corporation: Selected Legal Aspects, 36 MERCER L. REV. 567,577-
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reverse triangular merger by permitting conversion of shares of 
the target into securities of "the surviving corporation or any 
other corporation."120 
Section 11.02 of the New MBCA again modernizes Missis­
sippi law by providing a direct means to the same result: a plan 
of share exchange, whereby the shares of the target are ex­
changed for securities of the acquiring or any other corporation, 
or cash or other property.121 The exchange is subject to all of the 
procedural safeguards, including dissenters' rights, as a 
merger.122 
Procedurally, the plan of merger or share exchange, once 
adopted, is submitted either to the shareholders of both corpora­
tions (merger) or the acquired corporation (share exchange)123 
for approval.124 Essentially the same steps for approval are re­
quired as apply to amendments of the articles, including major­
ity vote rather than two-thirds as under the Old MBCA, and 
voting by voting groups under some circumstances.1211 
The New MBCA diverges from prior law in specifying lim­
ited circumstances in which the shareholders of the surviving 
corporation need not approve a merger.126 In effect it is a de 
minimis exception for instances in which the merger does not 
significantly affect the survivor's shareholders; e.g. , the articles 
of the survivor are not substantively changed, the shareholders 
of the survivor hold the identical number of shares as before the 
78 (1985) [hereinafter Norton] (discussion of triangular mergers). 
"0 Old MBCA, supra note 1,  § 14l(c)(emphasis added). As previously noted, how­
ev�r, cash was not a permissible item of exchange. See supra notes 1 14- 15 and accompa­
nying text. 
1 1 1  See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 1 1 .02 (b)(3). 
111 The statute does not, of course, preclude the acquisition of another corporation's 
shares through a voluntary tender offer or other consensual transaction. Id. § ll.02(d). 
For additional background on share exchanges see Norton supra note 119 at 581-
82. 
I > I 
• 
'03 Therein lies, obviously, one of the advantages of the share exchange: since the 
�nterests of �he shareholders of the acquiring corporations are not directly affected, there 
is no necessity for their approval of the acquisition. 
11' See New MBCA f • supra note l, § 11 .03 (outlining procedure for approval o 
merger or share exchange) . 
. 
111 Id. § l l .03(e)-(f). See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (procedure for 
article amendments). 
11• See New MBCA, supra note 1, § ll .03(g). 
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merger, and the shares issued as part of the merger do not in­
crease the outstanding voting and participating shares of the 
survivor by more than twenty percent. While this avoids the ne­
cessity of a shareholder meeting for the survivor, it is probably 
of limited practical significance. A shareholder's meeting can, in 
any event, be avoided by a three-step transaction: the survivor 
can create a wholly-owned subsidiary; it can cause the subsidiary 
and target to merge; then,  if desired, it can effect a short-form 
merger of the subsidiary without a shareholder vote.127 
As under the Old MBCA,138 the new statute provides for the 
short-form merger of a substantially owned subsidiary without 
any shareholder action. The major change effected by the New 
MBCA is that the necessary ownership threshold is now ninety, 
rather than ninety-five, percent.128 
After approval of a plan of merger or share exchange by the 
shareholders (or by the directors alone if shareholder action is 
unnecessary) articles of merger or share exchange are filed with 
the Secretary of State. 18° Consistent with the general approach 
of the New MBCA, the articles are self-effectuating and no cer­
tificate of merger is issued by the Secretary. 
The provisions of the New MBCA involving the effects of a 
merger or share exchange, and addressing combinations between 
domestic and foreign corporations, do not materially differ from 
the prior statute. is1 
D. Dissolution 
The New MBCA provisions on dissolution do not, for the 
most part, differ significantly from the old statute.132 In a few 
111 See Murphy, The New Virginia Stock Corporation Act: A Primer, 20 U. Rieu. L. REv. 67, 122 (1985) [hereinafter Murphy] (analyzing effect of not having shareholders meeting on merger or share exchange). 128 s ee Old MBCA, supra note 1 § 149. 
"• s 
' 
ee New MBCA, supra note 1, § 11.04. ISO Id. § 11.05. 
131 Compare Old MBCA, supra note l, §§ 151, 153, with New MBCA, supra note 1 ,  § §  11.06, 11.07. 
d. 
131 
E.g. ,  plenary authority to effect a dissolution is still granted to incorporators or irectors of a corporation which has not issued shares nor commenced business. Com­�are Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 163, with New MBCA, supra note 1, § 14.01. In addi­tion, the provisions on judicial dissolution are not materially different. Compare Old 
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respects, however, the new act makes important changes in the 
prior law. 
Regarding voluntary dissolution, the New MBCA alters pre­
sent law in two ways. First, the New MBCA requires action of 
both directors and shareholder to effect dissolution of an organ­
ized corporation;133 the former provision for dissolution by unan­
imous written consent of shareholders is now eliminated. 134 
Thus, the formality of a board resolution will have to be ob­
served in any dissolution of a corporation which has begun busi­
ness or issued stock. Second, consistent with the preceding dis­
cussions, dissolution now requires the consent of only a bare 
majority of shares entitled to vote in the absence of a provision 
in the articles increasing the threshold;136 the prior act, of 
course, required a two-thirds affirmative vote. 1 36 
Procedurally, the separate steps of filing an intent to dis­
solve, followed by winding up of the corporate affairs and the 
filing of formal articles of dissolution,137 are eliminated. Rather, 
after dissolution, articles of dissolution will now be filed with the 
Secretary of State, and the corporation will be deemed dissolved 
as of their effective date.138 This, in turn, triggers the winding up 
and liquidation of its business and affairs, the procedure for 
which is outlined in section 14.05.139 The most significant proce­
dural changes are in the area of liabilities. More detail is now 
included involving notice to known creditors; this must be done 
in writing and allow not less than 120 days for the filing of a 
claim. Any such claim will be barred if the claimant fails to re­
spond or to file an action to enforce a claim within 90 days of its 
MBCA, supra note 1, §§ 193, 195, with New MBCA, supra note l, § §  14.30, 14.31. 
133 See New MBCA, supra note 1 ,  § 14.02. 
1•• See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 165 . 
• 1 30 See New MBCA, supra note 1 ,  § 14.02(e). The board can also increase the re-
quired vote by so conditioning its submission to shareholders. Id. § 14.02(c). 
138 See Old MBCA, supra note 1,  § 167(c). 
1'1 Id. §§ 167{d), 169-173, 183-85. 
••• See New MBCA, supra note 1 ,  § 14.03. 
130 .Id' . §  14.05. This includes the collection of assets, disposition o f  all property not 
to be
. 
d
.
istnbuted to shareholders, payment of outstanding liabilities, distribution of the 
rema�nmg p�opel'ty to shareholders, and such other acts "necessary to wind up and liqui­
date its busi�ess a�d affairs." Id. § 14.05(a). The statute also outlines those matters not affected by dissolution per se, including title to the corporation's property. Id. § 14.05(b). 
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rejection by the corporation. 140 
297 
Perhaps more significant is the New MBCA's treatment of 
unknown claims. The new act allows the corporation to publish 
notice in a newspaper of general circulation providing a proce­
dure for the filing of unknown or contingent claims, and a state­
ment that any such claim will be barred if an action to enforce is 
not filed within five years.1'1  This provision now provides, in ef­
fect, a uniform statute of limitations for unknown or contingent 
claims.142 Moreover, it effectively overrules Naugher v. Fox 
River Tractor Company. 143 In that case, the court held under 
section 209 of the Old MBCA that while a product liability ac­
tion against a dissolved corporation arose at the time of manu­
facture, it would not be barred until six years from the date of 
injury,1" thereby creating virtually unlimited exposure for such 
claims.146 
In the area of involuntary dissolution, two important 
changes are made by the New MBCA. The first is an entirely 
new set of provisions for a dministrative dissolution. The grounds 
for dissolution by the Secretary of State now include failure to 
pay franchise taxes or penalties; failure to file an annual report; 
failure to maintain a registered office, or agent, or to notify the 
Secretary of State of changes thereto; and the expiration of a 
corporation's duration. 148 Given the largely ministerial nature of 
�·
· Id. § 14.06. The prior statute required that written notice be sent but did not specify any sanction for failure to respond. Old MBCA, s upra note 1, § 173(a). Rather, such claims survived for the period of the applicable statute of limitations. Id. § 209. 141 See New MBCA, supra note 1 ,  § 14.07. This would have the effect, after the five year period, of barring known claimants not receiving notice; claimants who filed a claim bu� were not paid; and contingent claims or those based on events occurring after disso­
�ution. Id. § 14.07. If an action is timely filed, the corporation (to the extent of the assets 
tt h . d' t 'b as retamed) or shareholders (for their pro rata share or the amount of assets is ri -uted to them, whichever is less) can be held liable. Id. § 14.07(d). 142 Id. § 14.07(c). Under the Old MBCA the limitation period varied according to the nature of the claim. See supra note 140. ua 446 F.Supp. 1281 (N.D. Miss. 1977) . ... Id. at 1282-83 (analyzing Mississippi's general statute of limitations). 
'.·� Id. at 1283. See also New MBCA, supra note 1, § 14.07(c)(3). Presuming th�t.the 
�!
u�stte notice is pu�lished, any such claim would either be '.'contingent" (if th� m1ury 
.
incurred before dissolution) or "based on an event occurrmg after the effective date of dissolution" (if the injury was incurred at that time), and thus would be barred by the Passage of five years under New MBCA § 14.07(c)(3). 148 See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 14.20. Under the MBCA certain grounds would 
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such vices, however, the statute also provides a fairly simple pro­
cedure for reinstatement upon cure, together with a right of ju­
dicial appeal from · any denial of reinstatement. 147 
The other principal innovation of the New MBCA is the 
power granted to a court conducting a proceeding for judicial 
dissolution to appoint a custodian to manage its business as an 
alternative to a liquidating receiver.1"8 Although the statute is 
silent as to those factors to be weighed by the court in determin­
ing whether a custodianship would be appropriate, presumably 
it is intended as a less drastic alternative to liquidation and a 
device to effect a resolution of the internal difficulties which 
gave rise to the proceeding. 149 If nothing else, since the statute 
allows the delegation of "all powers of the corporation through 
or in place of its board of d irectors or officers" to the custo­
dian, 160 this may provide the requisite impetus to a buy-out of 
complaining shareholders or other voluntary settlement of the 
underlying controversy. If appropriate, the court may also con­
vert a custodianship to a receivership, and vice versa. 151 
E. Dissenters' Rights 
The traditional approach to dissenters' rights, as embodied 
in the Old MBCA,1112 has been the subject of criticism both by 
shareholder and management interests. For the shareholder who 
have justified involuntary judicial dissolution through an action filed by the Attorney 
General, or suspension of the corporation's charter by the Secretary of State. Old 
MBCA, supra note 1, §§ 187-89. As a practical matter, however, few such actions were 
purs�ed by. the. Attorney General, and the sanction of suspension (although theoretically carr�i�g -:v1th it denial of the privilege of doing business) often failed to provide the 
r�quisite im�e
.
tus f�r cor.rective action by a recalcitrant corporation's managers. The de­v
.
ice of administrative dissolution is both more economically efficient and, at the same 
time, may carry a connotation of seriousness that mere "suspension" did not . 
. 
For the procedure to be followed by the Secretary, including the requisite notice 
penods, see New MBCA, supra note 1 ,  § 14.21. 
'" See New MBCA, supra note 1 § 14.22-14 23 
••• Id 
' . .  
· § l4.32(a). The Old MBCA recognized only the receivership concept. Old 
MBCA, supra note l, § 195-97. 
:
: See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT. § 14.32 Official Comment (1984). 
'"' New MBCA, supra note 1, § 14.32 (c)(2). 
. 
Id. § 14.32(d). For other matters involving the procedure for judicial dissolution, 
see id. § §  14.3 1, 14.33. 
161 See Old MBCA, supra note 1 ,  § §  159, lGl. 
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objected to one of the enumerated transactions that triggered 
dissenters' rights, 163 this dissatisfaction was eminently under­
standable: the procedure for asserting them was highly complex, 
thus subjecting the dissenter to the risk of losing his rights by 
technical noncompliance, 164 and in any event involved the ex­
pense of a court action to determine the " fair value" of his 
shares if the parties could not agree. 166 In turn, that complexity 
and expense created from management's perspective an inherent 
potential for nuisance litigation motivated by settlement value, 
or demands based upon unrealistic visions of a stock's worth.1" 
Finally, the generally worded definition of "fair value" in the 
statute offered no guidance as to how it should be determined.167 
108 Id. § 159. Under the Old MBCA these included only (1) mergers and consolida­
tions and (2) the sale or exchange of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets 
other than in the ordinary course of business. Id. 
10' In brief, the Old MBCA demanded the following: (1) written objection by the 
shareholder prior to or at the meeting where action was to be taken; (2) the shareholder 
had to vote against the action; (3) the shareholder had to make written demand for pay­
ment of the "fair value" of his shares within 10 days of the vote (15 days if a short-form 
merger); (4) if within 30 days thereafter the corporation and shareholder could not agree 
on such fair value, then the corporation could, within 60 days of the transaction com­
plained of, file an action to determine the fair value of his shares; 
°(5) if the corporation 
failed to bring such an action within the 60 day period, then any shareholder could com­
mence the action. In all events, the shareholder was required to deposit his share certifi­
cates with the corporation within 20 days of his initial demand; failure to do so would 
result in the termination of his rights unless his failure was excused by a court "for good 
and sufficient cause." Id. § 161. 
. 
�f course the corporation and shareholder might agree upon the question of valua­
tion, m which instance payment was to be made within 90 days of the transaction. Id. 10� Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act 
Af!ectmg Dissenters' Rights, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855, 1856 (1977)[hereinafter Dissenters ' 
Rights]. Under the Old MBCA, the expense of a valuation proceeding was borne by the 
corporation unless the court found that the refusal by the shareholder to accept the 
corporation's offer was "arbitrary or vexatious or not in good faith," in which instance all or part of the expense could be taxed to the shareholder. In all events, each party had to pay his own attorneys' fees. Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 161. 100 S n ·  ee issenters ' Rights, supra note 155, at 1856. 
167 The most commonly accepted procedure is the so-called "Delaware block
" 
me�hod where the three elements of value, i.e., assets, market value, and earnings, are assigned a designated weight, and the amounts thereby determined are added to reach a per share value. Norton, supra note 119, at 585. A recent Mississippi case suggests an emphasis on historical earnings as the most significant component in the closely-held business. Hernando Bank v. Huff, 796 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1986). For general background see, e.g., Comment, Valuation of Shares in a Closely Held Corporation, 47 Miss. L.J. 715 0976Hexamination of factors used in  determining fair share value); Note, The Dissent-
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The drafters of the Model Act fundamentally restructured the 
concept of dissenters' rights in 1977 to strike a more equitable 
balance of competing policies.168 The New MBCA adopts the 
Model Act approach, which broadly seeks to e ncourage the par­
ties to compromise their differences privately, with judicial ap­
praisal a vailable only as a matter of last resort. 169 Technically 
the statute changes prior law in se veral significant respects. 
Initially, the New MBCA expands the scope of dissenters' 
rights over the limitations pre viously imposed. 1 60 Dissenters' 
rights now apply to mergers as to which the dissenter has a right 
to vote ; short-form mergers where the dissenter owns shares of 
the corporation which does not sur vive; share e xchanges if the 
dissenter is a shareholder of the acquired corporation and has a 
right to vote on the plan ; sales or exchanges of all or substan­
tially all assets not in the ordinary course of b usiness (e xcluding 
judicial sales and liquidation sales in which the proceeds are dis­
tributed to shareholders within one year) ; amendments to the 
articles that affect a dissenter's shares in any of five enumerated 
ways; and other transactions as to which the articles, bylaws, or 
board resolution provide dissenters' rights. 161 In addition, dis­
senters' rights are now e xtended to beneficial shareholders as 
well as shareholders of record.1 62 
In another respect, however, the New MBCA is more re­
strictive than the old law. Dissenters' rights are now made the 
exclusive remedy of a shareholder to whom the r ights accrue un-
ing Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 629 ( 1977)(ger.'lral discussion of 
relevant factors in determining value of shares held by dissenting shareholder). 
, .. See Dissenters' Rights, supra note 155, at 1856-57. 
'"' REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP AcT Ch. 13 Introductory Comment (1984). '00 See supra note 153. 
'"'. See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 13.02. The inclusion of article amendments 
remedies perhaps the most glaring deficiency of the Old MBCA, under which, for exam­
pl
.
e, shares 
.
could b� stripped ?f preferences, redemption rights, or preemptive rights without a right to dissent. Cf. id. § 13.02 (4). 
r 
••:. Cor:ipare Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 3(g)(defining shareholder as a "holder of ecord ) with New MBCA, supra note 1, § 13.01 (7) (defining shareholder as "the record shareholder or the benefic1·a1 shar h Id " f · · · · ) 
A . 
e o er or purposes of dissenters' nghts prov1s10ns · 
1988 amendment makes it clear that "beneficial shareholders" include the beneficial 
�:;ers of share� held by a voti�g trust. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-13.01(6) (Supp. 1988). the mechamcs of the assertion of dissenters' right by a beneficial owner, see id. § 13.03(b). 
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less the proposed action is "unlawful or fraudulent" as to either 
the shareholder or corporation. 183 This aspect of the law is likely 
to engender controversy. The rationale advanced by the drafters 
of the RMA is that so long as a majority of shareholders approve 
a transaction, their decision should prevail against a minority in­
terest which deems it unwise or disadvantageous even if a court 
should side with the minority. 184 While logic supports this pro­
position, it is defensible only if one assumes that the minority 
shareholder is assured of a fair payment for his shares. Although 
the question is certainly debatable, on balance by adopting the 
broad unlawfulness or fraud exception the statute is probably 
sufficiently flexible to alleviate any concerns that it unduly fa­
vors majority interests. •H 
While the overall goal of the New MBCA is to make the 
assertion of dissenters' rights a more practicable remedy, it 
should be noted that the enforcement procedure has not by any 
means been significantly simplified. The procedure is outlined in 
sections 13.20 through 1 3.28. Initially, if a meeting is called to 
consider an action triggering dissenters' rights, the notice of the 
meeting must state this and be accompanied by a copy of Chap­
ter 13 of the New MBCA. If the transaction does not require 
shareholder approval then the corporation must notify the 
shareholders of the action and send a dissenters' notice de­
scribed in section 13.22. 188 
If the action requires a shareholder vote then the share­
holder must give written notice of his intent to exercise dissent­
ers' rights before the vote is taken and either vote against the 
••• See New MBCA, supra note l, § 13.02(b). Consistent with this approach, the 
n?w statute also forecloses the former right of a shareholder to dissent only as to part of 
�is sh�res. See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 159. Such action is now permi�sible only in hose mstances where the shareholder acts as a nominee for several beneficial sharehold­ers, some of whom do not wish to dissent. New MBCA, supra note 1, § 13.03(a) . ... REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. Acr § 13.02 Official Comment 2 (1984). 
tea Wh'l t' . . 1 e eschewing any attempt at comprehensiveness, the RMA suggests ac 10ns In vwl?tion of legal voting provisions, in violation of the articles, and those involving 
?
ec��tlon or breach of fiduciary duties as examples of transactions not protected from J�dicial intervention. Id. It should be noted that the clear trend is to make dissenters' rights exclusive. For a collection of statutes and cases on point, see 3 MoDEL BUSINESS 
Coap, ACT ANN. 1372, 1374.2-1377 (Supp. 1987) . .•• s ee New MBCA, supra note l ,  § 13.20. 
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action or abstain. Failure to do so results in the forfeiture of his 
right to payment under Chapter 13. 167 Thus, as u nder prior law, 
strict attention to question of technical compliance is required. 
Following the meeting and within 10 days, the corporation 
must send a "dissenters' notice" to all shareholders who prop­
erly asserted dissenters' rights. The notice must inter alia state 
the time and place for demanding payment and tendering 
shares, supply a form for demanding payment, and set a date 
not less than 30 nor more than 60 days from the date of the 
notice by which the demand for payment must be received.168 
Thereafter the onus is upon the recipient to demand payment 
and deposit his shares pursuant to the terms of the notice; again 
his failure to comply will result in the loss o f  his rights under 
Chapter 13.169 
Within 60 days after the deadline for demanding payment 
and depositing shares, 170 the corporation is required to pay each 
complying dissenter the amount estimated by the corporation to 
be the fair value of his shares with accrued interest. The corpo­
ration must transmit with the payment financial statements for 
a fiscal year ended not more than 16 months prior to payment, 
an explanation of the method used to determine fair value and 
to calculate interest, a statement of the dissenters' rights under 
section 13.28 if he is dissatisfied with the offer, and yet another 
copy of Chapter 13.171 
tu Id. § 13.21. 
1•• Id. § 13.22. The notice must also advise holders of uncertified shares of any re­
strictions that will be placed upon transfer after demand, and include a copy of Chapter 
13. Of course, as to the latter one may legitimately question the !ayperson's ability to 
understand such a complex statute, but clearly no harm is done by its inclusion. 
1•• Id. § 12.23(a), (c). The statute makes it clear however that the demanding �hareholder retai�s all other rights as a shareholder untii his righ� are cancelled or mod­
ified by effectuation of the transaction. Id. § 13.23(b). 110 See id. § 13.26(a). 
1 1 1  Id. § 13.25. Similar to the Old MBCA, the new act defines " fair value" as "the 
value 
.
0f the sha�es immediat
.
ely before the effectuation of the corporate action to which 
the dissenter
. objects, excludmg any appreciation or depreciation i n  anticipation of the corporate act10
.
n unless 
.
exclusion would be inequitable." Id. § 13.01(3). The drafters of 
the RMA candidly adrmt, however, that this offers little guidance (other than timing) as to the methodology to be employed in calculating "fair value." REVISED MODEL BUSINESS 
CORP. AcT § 13.01 Official Comment 3 (1984). See supra note 157 and accompanying 
text. 
If the corporation does not make the required payment within the 60 day limit it 
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Should a shareholder be dissatisfied with the amount ten­
dered, or if payment is not made by the corporation within the 
60 day period, under section 13.28 the dissenter may within 30 
days after payment is made transmit to the corporation his own 
estimate of the fair value of his shares together with a demand 
for that amount. Failure to do so waives his right to such 
demand.112 
Only if the parties fail to agree upon fair value after the 
exhaustion of this procedure can they resort to judicial ap­
praisal. The corporation must within 60 days after receiving de­
mand under section 13.28 file an action to determine the fair 
value of the dissenters' shares if no agreement is reached. Corpo­
rate counsel should note well the importance of timing; failure to 
file the action obligates the corporation to pay the demanded 
sum.173 All dissenters whose claims are unresolved are to be 
joined, and the court is empowered to appoint and define the 
responsibilities of appraisers. The dissenters are to receive judg­
ment for the amount, if any, by which the court-determined fair 
value, plus interest, exceeds the corporation's payment.11• 
Interestingly, the New MBCA is somewhat ambiguous as to 
what a dissatisfied dissenter should do with the payment he re­
ceives from the corporation if he intends to make a supplemen­
tal demand under section 13.28. The only light that the RMA 
comments shed upon the issue is that the statute is meant to 
force the corporation to pay without taking advantage of any de­
lay pending final agreement, thereby eliminating the leverage 
that dilatory tactics would provide. Likewise, the shareholder is 
to be afforded immediate use of the amount tendered.176 The 
statutory formulation of judicial relief, i.e. , the difference be-
must return the certificates to the shareholder- if thereafter the transaction complained of . ' ted N is consummated, the above procedure of notice and demand must be repea · ew MBCA, supra, note 1, § 13.26. 
d 1
72 See New MBCA, supra note l, § 13.28. The right to make his own estimate and e�and is also provided if the corporation does not consummate the transaction of which he complains, but fails to return his certificates or release transfer restrictions on uncertificated shares under section 13.26(a). 178 Id. § 13.03(a). Under the Old MBCA no such sanction existed; rather it only freed the dissenter to file the action. See supra note 154. 
174 Id 
· 
§ 13.30(c)-(e). 
175 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. A<::r § 13.25 Official Comment (1984). 
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tween fair value and the corporation's payment, suggests that 
the shareholder should be free to avail himself immediately of 
the initial payment without risking a waiver of his rights. More­
over, the statutory right to make the supplemental demand 
should foreclose the addition of any "accord and satisfaction" 
language to the corporation's check. Nonetheless, an explicit 
statement of the shareholder's right to use the initial payment 
pending resolution of his supplemental demand would be a de­
sirable amendment to the new MBCA; absent this the prudent 
dissenter negotiating a check tendered pursuant to section 13.25 
might well include a reservation of rights in his endorsement.178 
While the costs of the judicial proceeding, including ex­
penses incurred by appraisers, are ordinarily borne by the corpo­
ration, the statute grants broad discretion to the court to tax 
such expenses to dissenters if it deems them to have acted arbi­
trarily, vexatiously or in bad faith. Likewise, attorneys' fees can 
be imposed upon either the corporation or dissenters if the court 
finds that either party did not comply in good faith with the 
provisions of Chapter 13.177 
Only experience will show whether the new act accomplishes 
the avowed goal of rendering dissenters' rights a more realistic 
remedy. While the New MBCA is far clearer and better organ­
ized than its predecessor, in frankness it has not simplified the 
procedure for exercising dissenters' rights to any appreciable ex­
tent. The same pitfalls exist as before for the shareholder who 
lacks diligence in pursuing his rights, and it would be foolhardy 
indeed for a dissenter not to engage the services of competent 
counsel. On the other hand, procedural aspects aside, the statu­
tory incentives for negotiated settlement - particularly 
�andatory early payment by the corporation (as opposed to a 
simple off er) and the right for dissenters to make a supplemen­
tal demand - seem real and substantial. In this regard the New 
MBCA represents a positive step towards more satisfactory reso­
lution of these disputes . 
• 118 Cf.
. Miss. ConE ANN. § 75-1-207 (1972)(UCC provision for reservation or preser­vation of rights). 
"' See New MBCA 
. . 
• supra note 1, § 13.31 (a), (b). This discretion also extends to 
requmn� that some dissenters contribute to the attorney's fees of other dissenters if they substantially benefitted from the services performed by the latter. Id. § 13.31(c). 
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IV. CLOSE CORPORATIONS 
A. Introduction 
The overwhelming majority of Mississippi corporations are 
closely held, and surely there is no debate that such entities are 
different, not just in degree but in kind, from the public corpo­
ration. One of the d ominant themes in corporate scholarship and 
legislation, at least since the mid-1950's, has been the attempt to 
respond effectively to problems peculiar to the close corpora­
tion.178 General corporation statutes have commonly adapted to 
meet some of the needs of close corporations, but traditional 
statutes such as the Old MBCA have proven deficient in many 
particulars. Moreover, while judicial recognition of the special 
nature of the close corporation has increased in recent years, 179 
this trend has not been universal, particularly in instances where 
shareholder control over board discretion has been involved.180 
Clearly, additional statutory "safe harbors" are desirable to fa­
cilitate effective planning where variations of the statutory 
118 Some common examples are (1) supermajority vote and quorum provisions; (2) 
provision for informal shareholder or director action by unanimous consent or conference 
telephone call; (3) broad powers of delegation to board committees; (4) broad power to 
restrict transfers of shares; (5) authorization of voting trusts; (6) provisions for one incor­
porator; (7) provision for fewer than three directors; and (8) broader provisions for disso­
lution, e.g., by unanimous shareholder consent. Miller, Illinois Close Corporations: Anal­
ysis of the New Act, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 587, 601 (1978). Of these it is noteworthy that 
the Old MBCA had no provision as to (4), (6), or (7), and as to (2) did not recognize 
conference telephone calls as a permissible means of shareholder or director action. Old 
MBCA, supra note 1. 
178 Perhaps the best-known example is Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E. 
2d 505, 515-16 (Mass. 1975), which states that shareholders in a close corporation owe 
one another substantially the same fiduciary duties as partners. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has followed this trend in an important recent deci­
sion involving issues of authority. In Baxter Porter & Sons Well Servicing Co. v. Venture 
Oil Corp., 488 So. 2d 793, 796 (Miss. 1986), the court equated the authority of a share­
holder, executive officer and director of a close corporation to that of a partner in a 
partnership as to matters that constitute carrying on the usual business of the corpora­
tion. Cf. Miss. ConE ANN. § 79-12-17(a)(Supp. 1987)(authority of partnership as agent for 
partnership). While the result reached in Baxter Porter, i.e., binding the corporation to 
acts undertaken by such a person without formal board approval, is not surprising, the 
court's candid admission that the pristine rules of agency simply should not apply in the 
c
�ose corporation setting is a praiseworthy move towards more honest and realistic deci­
sionmaking in this area. 
180 See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text. 
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model are appropriate. Paradoxically, though, the Old MBCA 
reflected a large corporation orientation.181  
The recent response to this need has been broadly twofold: 
in some states, the enaction of special "close corporation" stat­
utes either as a supplement or alternative to the general corpo­
ration statute;182 in others, the addition of special provisions of 
particular significance to the close corporation to a general cor­
poration statute. The RMA, from which the New MBCA was de­
rived, takes the latter approach.183 I believe this is fundamen­
tally sound,184 and certainly the New MBCA is a vast 
improvement over its predecessor. Nonetheless, there remain 
181 See Part One, supra note 3, at 170 n. 15. 
,.. These statutes generally adopt criteria for classification a s  a statutory close cor­
poration, and a set of special rules applicable only to such corporations. For an extensive 
discussion of such statutes, see 1 H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § l. 14b (2d ed. 1971 & 
Supp. 1987) [hereinafter O'NEAL]. A list of states with integrated close corporation provi­
sions can be found at 4 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr ANN. 1868 (3d ed. Supp. 1987). 
188 In 1981, the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws first promulgated a proposed 
supplement to the Model Act, presenting an integrated close corporation statute. See 
Committee on Corporate Laws, Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model 
Business Corporation Act, 37 Bus. LAw. 269 (198l) (results o f  committee's work). The 
Supplement was formally adopted with amendments in 1983. See Committee on Corpo­
rate Laws, Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Business. Corporation 
Act, 38 Bus. LAW. 1031 (1983)(detailing adoption of amendments).  The current text can 
be found at 4 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 1803-1862 (3d ed. 1985). The Supplement 
was, however, not proposed by the Task Force as a part of the Business Law Reform 
legislative package. For a summary and critique of the Supplement, see Kessler, The 
ABA Close Corporation Statute, 36 MERCER L. REv. 661 (1985). 
11• Author's Note: The debate over the desirability of integrated close corporation 
statutes is of long standing, and I will make no effort to resolve it here. A useful sum­
mary of the arguments pro and con is found in O'NEAL, supra note 182, §§ l .13-l.14(c). I 
h�ve bee� �onvinced by those who argue that a well-drafted general incorporation act 
with prov1s10ns that respond to basic close corporation issues offers sufficient flexibility 
to planners without the necessity for the creation of an arbitrarily defined "statutory 
close corporat
.
ion." A well-reasoned statement of this proposition is Karjala, A Second 
Look at Special Close Corporation Legislation, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1207 (1980)[hereinafter 
Karjala]. It is . noteworthy that Florida, which adopted one o f  the pioneering integrate
d 
close corporat10n acts, subsequently repealed it. 
Perhaps more germane is whether it is rational to maintain artificial demarcations 
�etw�en the partnership and corporation in the small business setting. The ultimate goal 
m this area more appropriately might be a new unified small business form combining 
the most desirable features of the laws of partnerships and corporations. For a discussion 
of this question, see Haynsworth, The Need for a Unified Small Business Legal Struc­
tur:, 33 Bus. LAW. 849 (1978). This, however, goes beyond the scope of the present 
article. 
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some problem areas which the new act does not address, and to 
which the legislature should give close attention in the future. 
Before dealing with those issues, however, I will discuss the ma­
jor innovations of the New MBCA. 
B. Share Trans{ er Restrictions. 
The Old MBCA did not directly validate restrictions on the 
transfer of shares, thus leaving the efficacy of such devices to be 
determined by judicial precedent.1H The New MBCA greatly 
improves the law by explicitly authorizing share transfer restric­
tions and delineating the types of restrictions which may be 
permissible. 
Under section 6.27, transfer restrictions are authorized to 
maintain a corporation's status where determined by the num­
ber of its shareholders (e.g., an election under Subchapter S of 
the Internal Revenue Code), to preserve a securities law exemp­
tion, or for "any other reasonable purpose."186 The types of re­
strictions authorized by the statute are (1) rights of first refusal, 
(2) obligations to purchase restricted shares, presumably upon 
the occurrence of some contingency, (3) consent provisions if not 
"manifestly unreasonable," and (4) disqualifications of certain 
p urchasers ( e .g . , competitors)  i f  not " m a n i fe s t l y  
unreasonable. "187 
180 The leading case was Fayard v. Fayard, 293 So. 2d 421 (1974), which adopted the 
rule that transfer restrictions in close corporations would be sustained if determined to 
be "reasonable in the light of the relevant circumstances." Id. at 423. The court went on 
to enumerate the factors to be considered as including: (1)  size of the corporation, (2) 
degree of the restraint, (3) duration of the restraint, (4) method of fixing share value, (5) 
relation of the restraint to corporate objectives, (6) the threat posed by a hostile share­
holder, and (7) the likelihood that the restriction would serve the corporation's best in­
terest. Applying this test the court held that a restriction in  a family corporation requir­
ing consent of all shareholders to any transfer was valid as to transfers outside of the 
f�mily but invalid as to intrafamily transactions. Id. at 424. One might, however, ques­
tion the court's premise that transfers to third parties would be inherently more disrup­
tive and prone to create disharmony than transfers to other family members. 186 See New MBCA, supra note 1, 6.27(c). Of course this still leaves the definition of 
such "reasonable purposes" ultimately in the hands of courts, but there is a substantial 
body of caselaw nationwide from which guidance can be drawn. For a collection and 
summary of cases, see 1 MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT ANN. 432-443 (3d ed. Supp. 1987). 
117 See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 6.27(c). Consent restrictions have been particu­
larly risky at common law, despite the Fayard court's acceptance in the family corpora-
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The usefulness of share transfer restrictions, both for con­
trolling entry to and exit from a business venture and for pro­
viding liquidity of investment, are well known and need not be 
repeated here. In light of the preceding discussion of dissenters' 
rights, however, one might note a particular advantage that such 
provisions can serve in the closely-held corporation as a contrac­
tual alternative to Chapter 13. A provision mandating the buy­
out of a minority interest upon the occurrence of some condition 
can not only be extended beyond the statutory events triggering 
dissenters' rights, but also has the advantage of allowing the 
parties to fix the price of shares in advance of any dispute and 
thereby avoid the possible necessity of judicial appraisal. 
The statute permits transfer restrictions in either the arti­
cles, bylaws or separate contracts; of course those owning shares 
prior to the adoption of a restriction are bound only if they vote 
for it or become parties to the contract. In order to be enforcea­
ble against third party transferees the restriction must be con­
spicuously legended on the front or back of a certificate.188 
C. Shareholders' Agreements. 
While the Old MBCA had no provisions on shareholders' 
agreements other than formal voting trusts, 189 the common law 
generally recognized the validity of agreements among share­
holders dictating how they would vote their shares.190 Rather, 
the problems encountered with so-called "pooling agree­
ments"191 have generally been of two types. The first is to fash-
tion context. See, e.g., Rafe v. Hindin, 29 App. Div. 2d 481, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 662, 663-64 
( 1968)(restriction which did not provide that consent would not be unreasonably with­
hel� was invali� restraint on alienation). Of course, even where such a restriction was 
validly entered mto, a court might refuse to enforce it if consent is wrongfully withheld, 
e.g., as a means of forcing a sacrifice sale. 
18� �ee. New �BCA, supra note 1, § 6.,27 (a), (b). This is likewise necessary under the �:ssissippi Uniform Commercial Code. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-8-204 (1972). 
See Old MBCA, supra note 1, § 65. 
••• See, e.g., E_.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 881 ,  62 N.W. 2d 288, 
302 ( l�S4)(upholdmg agreement by majority and minority stockholders to vote their 
shares m such a way as to maintain equal board representation) . '01  It should b h · d h · · · . e emp as1ze t at this d1scuss10n deals only with agreements respect-mg matters as to which shareholders are competent to act primarily the election of di­rectors. Agreements by shareholders encroaching upon boa�d authority are dealt with at 
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ion an appropriate enforcement mechanism. 192 An irrevocable 
proxy to an arbitrator o r  non-defaulting shareholder would seem 
an obvious answer. In those states without specific statutory au­
thorization for irrevocable proxies, however, one would have to 
argue that it was rendered irrevocable as a proxy coupled with 
an interest.193 This was not clearcut by any means. Moreover, it 
bore upon the second problem, i.e. , whether a pooling agreement 
might be invalidated as constituting a voting trust that did not 
comply with statutory requirements.194 Clearly, statutory defini­
tion of the acceptable parameters of such agreements is the pref­
erable approach. 
The New MBCA responds to both concerns. Section 7.31 
grants broad authority for shareholders to enter into agreements 
defining "the manner in which they will vote their shares."1911 
The statute makes such agreements specifically enforceable, and 
infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text. 192 The classic case was Ringling v. Ringling Bros. Barnam & Bailey Combined 
Shows, Inc., 29 Del. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (Ch. 1946), modified, 29 Del. 610, 53 A.2d 441 
0947), in which the parties agreed that in the event of a disagreement, the matter would 
be submitted to an arbitrator whose decision would be binding. Since the agreement did 
not provide a right for the arbitrator to actually vote a defaulting party's shares, how­
ever, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancellor's decision to imply a proxy. 
Thus, the Supreme Court remedied the breach by refusing to count the defaulters' 
shares in the election of directors. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, without the defaulter's 
votes the plaintiff was outvoted by a competing shareholder, who thereby gained control 
of the corporation. Ringling, 29 Del. at 614, 53 A.2d at 244. See Note, Specific Enforce­
ment of Shareholder Voting Agreements, 15 U. Cm. L. REV. 738 (1947)(specific enforce­
ment of unobjectionable voting agreements desirable as matter of public policy). 193 
Prior Mississippi law had no express provision for irrevocable proxies. See Old 
MBCA, supra note 1, § 63. 194 Again the classic case came from Delaware. In Abercrombie v. Davies, 36 Del. 
371, 130 A. 2d 338 (1957), the court struck down an "Agent's Agreement" under which 
shareholders deposited their shares with agents who were granted irrevocable proxies to 
vo� the shares for a period of ten years. Id. at 376, 130 A. 2d at 344. The court held that 
this was a secret voting trust that violated the requirements of the voting trust statute. 
Id. In distinguishing this arrangement from the valid pooling agreement in Ringling, the 
court emphasized inter alia the absence of irrevocable proxies in Ringling. Id. at 377-78, 
130 A. 2d at 345-46. Abercrombie was subsequently overruled in substance by the Dela­
ware Legislature, see DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(c), (e)(l968), and the Delaware Su­
preme Court has apparently retreated somewhat from its rigorous application. See 
Oceanic Exploration Co. v. Grynberg, 428 A.2d 1, 6-7 (Del. 1981)(voting trust provisions 
�hich were part of broad agreement of corporate reorganization were not subject to vot­ing trust statute restrictions). 10• S N ee ew MBCA, supra note 1, § 7.3l(a). 
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provides that proxies granted by parties to such agreements are 
irrevocable.196 Finally, the act specifically excludes such agree­
ments from the voting trust statute, section 7 .30. 197 
On the other hand, it must be emphasized that these sec­
tions do not govern shareholder control agreements that affect 
the discretion of the board of directors. Under the 1988 amend­
ments, the New MBCA now conforms to the RMA and allows a 
corporation with fifty or fewer shareholders to dispense entirely 
with the board of directors and be governed by its shareholders 
in the fashion of partnerships.198 Absent this right of direct 
shareholder management, planners must draft cautiously any 
provisions that seek to control the board's powers of manage­
ment lest they run afoul of common-law resistance to such at­
tempts.199 While courts have tended recently to view such agree­
ments more favorably,200 even unanimous shareholder agreement 
, .. Id. §§ 7.22(d) (5), 7.31(b). 
117 Id. § 7 .31(a) .  The voting trust provisions d o  not materially differ from prior law. 
m Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.0l(c) (Supp. 1988); see REVISED MooEL Bus1NESS CoRP. 
Acr § 8.0l(c) (1984). This issue is also discussed in Part One, supra note 3, at 183-84 
n.68. The legal impediment to this originally was section 194 of the Mississippi Constitu· 
tion, which could have been interpreted as requiring a board of directors for all corpora­
tions. As previously noted, section 194 has since been repealed. See supra note 36. 
Of course, the 50 shareholder limit is subject to the criticism of arbitrariness, but 
since it appears in the RMA it has the merit of uniformity. 
"' See, e.g. Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 
175-76, 77 N.E.2d 633, 634-35 (1948)(agreement delegating management powers to ma­
jority shareholder for 19 years "completely sterilized" board and was therefore against 
public policy) ; McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 325-26, 189 N.E. 234, 236-37 
(1934)(agreement providing inter alia that shareholders would occupy certain offices and 
be paid fixed salaries was invalid attempt to control board where non-party minority 
interest existed). But see Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 412, 199 N.E. 641, 643 
(1936)(slight invasions of powers of directorate by shareholders is permissible where all 
shareholders are parties and creditors are not threatened) . • 100 The leading case is probably Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964), 
whic? upheld an agreement between two shareholders owning 208 of 220 shares that 
requued the payment of annual dividends and fixed salaries to their wives for five years 
after the death of a signatory shareholder. Id. at 27, 203 N.E. 2d at 587. The court for­
mu�ate
.d the applicable test as no public injury, no complaining minority interest, and 
no 
prei
.
udice to credit.ors. Id. at 25, 203 N.E. 2d at 585. Again, however, even Galler cannot 
be interpreted as meaning that "anything goes" if all shareholders agree. See e.g., 
Somers v. AAA Temporary Services, Inc., 5 Ill. App.3d 931, 932-33, 284 N.E.2d 462, 464· 
65 (1972)(voi�ing bylaw amendment passed by shareholders rather than directors; held 
that Galler did not permit direct contravention of statute). 
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cannot guarantee that such agreements are immune to attack. 201 
Unfortunately, the range of judicially permissible options re­
mains murky at best. 
From a policy perspective it would seem that shareholders 
of a close corporation, acting unanimously, should have the same 
freedom to order and manage their affairs by agreement as part­
ners of general partnerships have, without regard to the artificial 
distinctions of shareholders and directors. 202 This flexibility can 
now be achieved in Mississippi under the amended New 
MBCA;203 however simply providing for direct shareholder man­
agement for a qualified corporation does not obviate the need 
for carefully structured control agreements analogous to those 
utilized in partnerships. As with partners such matters are ap­
propriately governed contractually, not through a statutory 
model which is simply unrealistic in most close corporations. 
D. Dissention and Deadlock 
It is in the area of remedies for deadlock that the New 
MBCA is perhaps most deficient. As previously discussed, the 
act now allows a court to appoint a custodian to manage the af­
fairs of a solvent corporation, which is certainly an improvement 
over prior law.20• However, the grounds for judicial dissolution 
under section 14.30 are basically the same as under prior law, 
requiring a showing of irreparable harm in the event of director 
deadlock, shareholder deadlock preventing election of directors 
for two years, "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent" actions of direc­
tors or majority shareholders, or misapplication or waste of as­
sets. 206 Thus the new act does not include more liberal provi­
sions of some modern statutes allowing, e.g. , dissolution where 
the business cannot function to the benefit of shareholders gen-
201 The Long Park decision is a frequently cited example. See supra note 199. 202 See Bradley, Toward A More Perfect Close Corporation - The Need for More 
a�d Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L. J. 1145, 1183 (1966)(close corporation should pro­
vide for validity of unanimous agreements affecting management on control of 
corporation). 
201 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 20• See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text. 206 See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 14.30(2). 
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erally or pursuant to any provision in the articles. 206 Given the 
traditional disinclination of courts to order dissolution and the 
stringency of such standards as irreparable injury, fraud, oppres­
sion, and waste, the statute is arguably an inadequate response 
to the plight of the minority shareholder who may find himself 
locked into an inviable investment without the "Wall Street Op­
tion" of public corporation shareholders to sell in a waiting 
market. 
The problem of illiquidity of the close corporation invest­
ment, particularly a minority interest, is probably the most vex­
ing one still facing legislators and close corporation planners. 
The "liquidation right"207 of partners in a general partnership, 
even one constituted for a term,208 simply is not part of the cor­
porate model. While the appropriate statutory response has 
been much debated, I would favor the approach of authorizing 
provisions in the articles of smaller corporations (to be consis­
tent, those with fifty or fewer shareholders) granting any share­
holder, or holders of a specified number or percentage of shares, 
the option to cause dissolution at will or upon the occurrence of 
a specified event or contingency.209 While this may be criticized 
as giving individual shareholders too much leverage over the ma­
jority, it simply approximates the partnership model and, in any 
event, would be subject to arms-length negotiation at the time of 
incorporation. Such a statute should require unanimous consent 
of shareholders to any amendment of the articles to provide the 
right, and for legending share certificates to protect innocent 
purchasers. So long as all parties approach the issue with eyes 
open, this seems a preferable alternative to the risks run by mi­
nority shareholders without such a cash-out option.210 
••• E.g., S.C CODE § 33-21-150 (1976) . 
. 
'01 This was the term coined by Professor Bromberg. Bromberg, Partnership Disso­
lutio•�• - Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 43 Tux. L. REV. 631, 647 (1965). 
s
_
e� Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-12-75 (Supp. 1987)(Mississippi Uniform Partnership 
Act prov1s1on on withdrawal of partners). 
109 See, e.�. ,  DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355 (a)(l968)(allows stockholders option to dis­
solve corporation at will or upon specified event or contingency). 2 1 0 Of course, the minority can also be protected in the event of dissent by buy-out 
agreements, h
.
ut �hese presuppose both the willingness of majority shareholders to as­
�:me this �b.
hgation and th: financial ability to follow through. On the other hand, it 
uld be dismgenuous to thmk that "at-will dissolution" will not in some instances be 
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V. MISCELLANEOUS 
A. Foreign Corporations 
The New MBCA provisions on foreign corporations211 do 
not merit extensive discussion. There is, however, one important 
change in the area o f  qualification to do business. As is well 
known, the "door closing" provision of the Old MBCA,212 which 
denied access to state courts to foreign corporations that trans­
acted business in Mississippi without a certificate of authority, 
was narrowly construed by the Mississippi Supreme Court to 
preclude a corporation from suing on any cause of action that 
arose prior to qualification. Subsequent qualification would not 
retroactively cure the defect. 213 This punitive rule is reversed by 
the New MBCA, which expressly provides that a foreign corpo­
ration transacting business without a certificate of authority 
cannot bring an action in state court "until it obtains a certifi­
cate of authority," and allows a court to stay any proceeding un-
used as a leverage device in negotiations between dissenting factions. 
It should be noted that the suggested approach is by no means the most radical one 
that has been advanced. It does not, for example, protect the shareholder who does not 
bargain for and obtain the right to dissolve at will. In an important article, Professors 
Hetherington and Dooley advocated that this gap be closed statutorily by granting any 
minority shareholder in a close corporation the right to force the corporation to purchase 
all his shares at their fair value, so long as this would not render the corporation insol­�ent. This right would also be nonwaivable after two years from incorporation. Hether­
ington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the 
�emaining Close Cor poration Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 50-52 (1977). While provoca­
ti�e, I do not view this as a workable proposal at this time. For other criticisms, see �illman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Considera­
tion of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. 
�Ev. 1, 69-75 (1982) (questioning assumptions upon which advocation of at will dissolu­
tion by minority shareholders is based). 
211 S N ee ew MBCA, supra note 1, Chapter 15. 
212 s 0 ee Id MBCA, supra note 1, § 247. 
213 Parker v. Lin-Co. Producing Co., 197 So. 2d 228, 230 (Miss. 1967). This, of 
course, was contrary to the general rule in other states. See Dunn-Cooper, An Analysis of �ississippi's Treatment of Foreign Corporations, 55 Miss. L. J. 259, 261-62 (1985)(ex­
ammation of Mississippi's rule). 
. Ironically, the Mississippi Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion as to for­eign limited partnerships, holding that qualification applied retroactively. MISS CAL 2o4, Ltd. v. Upchurch, 465 So.2d 326 330 (Miss. 1985)(construing Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-13-213(l)(Supp. 1987), repealed, 1987 Miss. Laws ch. 448, § 1 105). 
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til the foreign corporation obtains the certificate. 214 
B. ConfUcts of Interest 
[VOL. 57 
While director conflicts of interest were discussed exten­
sively in Part One of this Article,2111 one aspect of the New 
MBCA as enacted deserves additional comment. I previously ad­
vocated the adoption of a statute modeled after Illinois law and 
the Exposure Draft of the RMA explicitly providing that direc­
tor or shareholder ratification of a conflict of interest transaction 
did not validate it for all purposes, but simply shifted the bur­
den of proof on the ultimate issue of fairness to those attacking 
the transaction. The Legislature, however, adopted the approach 
of the RMA, with one modification: shareholder ratification re­
quires the vote of two-thirds of eligible shares, rather than a 
majority.216 
I believe that the Legislature intended to enact only a sav­
ings statute that defines the burden of proof of fairness, but 
does not otherwise validate an unfair transaction. However, this 
provision - while apparently adopted with the salutary objec­
tive of making ratification logistically more difficult-may ulti­
mately yield an undesirable result. By increasing the requisite 
percentage for ratification, the statute may be susceptible to a 
construction that the more onerous vote requirement should 
thereafter shield the transaction from judicial review. For rea­
sons I have already discussed in Part One at length, I do not 
believe that this is sound policy. Thus I would urge the Legisla­
ture to correct this ambiguity in the New MBCA by express pro­
vision that it is intended only to shift the burden of proof, not to 
imbue a conflict of interest transaction with absolute validity.217 
::: See New MBCA, supra note l, § 15.02 (a), (c)(emphasis added). 
See Part One, supra note 3, at 202-11 (discussion of duty of loyalty). 
"' See New MBCA, supra note 1, § 8.31 (d). 
2 1 1  In fairness I should note that this is clearly not the position now adopted by the 
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws. The most recent amendment to the RMA proposed 
b
_
y the Committee is a new Subchapter F governing directors' conflict of interest transac­
l•
.
ons. Among other things the proposed amendment would absolutely prohibit any judi­
cial �ttack on a transaction that was approved by either the board or shareholders ac­
cording t
.
o statutorily prescribed procedures. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Ch?nges 1� the Model Business Corporation Act - Amendments Pertaining to Direc­tor s Confi1ctmg Interest Transactions, 43 Bus. LAW. 691 (1988). 
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C. Cumulative Voting 
Part One of this article advocated the elimination of 
mandatory cumulative voting. : u s  Thus it is satisfying to note 
that, with the repeal of section 194 of the Constitution,219 the 
Legislature has now amended the new Act to make cumulative 
voting permissive, although the right to cumulate applies unless 
eliminated by the articles. 220 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The 1987 Mississippi Business Corporation Act undoubt­
edly represents a substantial improvement over its predecessor. 
Nonetheless, as both Parts of this Article have attempted to il­
lustrate, there is much room for further refinement of the stat­
ute, and the experience of the bench and bar will undoubtedly 
expose even more areas which need legislative attention. One 
hopes that the Mississippi Legislature's history of "benign neg­
lect" of the 1 962 MBCA will not be indicative of its attitude 
towards our new Act; the 1988 amendments are an encouraging 
sign to the contrary. 221 In any event, the sweeping changes that 
it has already effected sound a call to immediate attention by 
Mississippi corporate practitioners. 
218 Part One, supre note 3, at 228-31. 210 See supra note 36. 
220 Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-7.28(b) (Supp. 1988). A conforming amendment was also 
made to section 8.08, dealing with director removal. 
The 1988 amendments also now permit, inter alia, directors to fill vacancies in the board, unles prohibited by the articles. Miss. ConE ANN. § 79-4-8.10 (a) (2) (Supp. 1988) . ••. s . ee generally 1988 Miss. Laws Chs. 368-69. 
